University of Denver

Digital Commons @ DU
Sturm College of Law: Faculty Scholarship

University of Denver Sturm College of Law

8-13-2007

Fast-Food Government and Physician-Assisted Death: The Role of
Direct Democracy in Federalism
K.K. DuVivier
University of Denver, kkduvivier@law.du.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/law_facpub
Part of the Health Law and Policy Commons, and the Law and Society Commons

Recommended Citation
K.K. DuVivier, Fast-Food Government and Physician-Assisted Death: The Role of Direct Democracy in
Federalism, 86 Ore. L. Rev. 895 (2007).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Denver Sturm College of Law at Digital
Commons @ DU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Sturm College of Law: Faculty Scholarship by an authorized
administrator of Digital Commons @ DU. For more information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,digcommons@du.edu.

Fast-Food Government and Physician-Assisted Death: The Role of Direct
Democracy in Federalism
Publication Statement
Copyright is held by the author. User is responsible for all copyright compliance.

This article is available at Digital Commons @ DU: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/law_facpub/316

OREGON
LAW
REVIEW

2007
VOLUME 86
NUMBER 4

Articles
K.K. DUVIVIER*

Fast-Food Government and
Physician-Assisted Death: The
Role of Direct Democracy in
Federalism
I.

Federalism and Direct Democracy ...................................

900

A . State Legislative Processes ..........................................
1. Pressure Points in the Traditional Legislative

904

Process .....................................................................

905

* Associate Professor, University of Denver Sturm College of Law. I would like
to dedicate this Article to my parents, Dr. Edward Keyes DuVivier and Mrs.
Marjorie Attebery DuVivier. They have supported and encouraged me in this work
and throughout my life. To me, they are the ultimate models of lives lived with
wisdom and dignity. I also would like to thank the following for their valuable input
and assistance in completing this piece: J. Robert Brown, Diane Burkhardt, Robert
Chang, David McDaniel, Kalin Ivany, Nora Pincus, and the members of the Legal
Writing Institute's 2007 Writer's Workshop.

[8951

OREGON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 86, 895

2. The Citizen Initiative Process ................................

907

B. The Benefit of Fast-Food Initiatives for
912

Innovation .....................................................................

1. Local Legislative Experimentation ....................... 915
II.

2. The History of Initiatives for Innovation ............. 917
3. Initiatives for Moral Issues .................................... 921
Federalism in the Physician-Assisted Death Debate ..... 924
A. On the Federal Side of the Federalism Balance:
A Federal Constitutional Right to Choose Death ... 930
1. The Right to Refuse Medical Treatment ............. 930
933
2. But N o R ight to D ie ...............................................
942
3. Federal Legislation .................................................
B. On the State Side of the Federalism Balance:

State Legislation and Initiatives .................................

945

1. Action by State Legislators ....................................

947

2. Action by Citizen Initiatives ..................................

959

3. Federal Affronts to Oregon's Death with

D ignity A ct .............................................................
C onclusion ......................................................................................

T

963
971

homas Jefferson argued that the key to lasting government
was flexibility and a process for change.1 When establishing

the representative form of government in the United States, the
I Thomas Jefferson stated:

[I]t may be proved that no society can make a perpetual constitution, or
even a perpetual law. The earth belongs always to the living generation.
They may manage it then, and what proceeds from it, as they please, during
their usufruct.... Every constitution, then, and every law, naturally expires
at the end of 19 years. If it be enforced longer, it is an act of force and not
of right.
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Sept. 6, 1789), in 5 THE
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 115, 121 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1895); see

also Harry N. Scheiber, Foreword: The Direct Ballot and State Constitutionalism,28
RUTGERS L.J. 787, 788 (1997) (addressing changes in the constitutional context,
Jefferson wrote, "[L]et us provide in our constitution for its revision at stated
periods ... so that it may be handed on, with periodical repairs, from generation to
generation, to the end of time, if anything human can so long endure" (quoting
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Samuel Kercheval (July 12, 1816), in THOMAS
JEFFERSON: WRITINGS 1395, 1402 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1984))).

Alexander

U.S.C Hamilton also conceded that "'the right of the people to alter or abolish the
established Constitution' must be seen as a 'fundamental principle of republican
Scheiber, supra, at 788 n.3 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at
government.'
489, 494 (Alexander Hamilton) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright ed., 1996)).
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Founders ensured that change would come gradually by setting
up an inefficient system of checks and balances.2
This
deliberative process sought to produce compromises reflecting
both minority and majority views.3 Maintaining some continuity
and consensus on issues helped avoid abrupt pendulum swings in
policy. The Founders' efforts resulted in one of the most
enduring governments in the world.
As is often the case, however, a strength can become a
weakness if carried to extremes. At times throughout our
nation's history, special interests have learned to employ the
deliberative process to deadlock legislatures and paralyze the
decision-making process. In the late 1800s, members of the
Progressive movement introduced an alternative to legislatures
controlled by special interests: direct democracy through statewide citizen initiatives. Although none of the original state
constitutions allowed citizens to impact legislation directly
through citizen initiatives,4 the Progressives successfully
introduced the process in several Western states from 1897 to
1918. 5 Currently, almost half of the states allow citizens to
2 See Steven A. Siegel, Historicism in Late Nineteenth-Century Constitutional
Thought, 1990 Wis. L. REV. 1431, 1479 n.265 ("[T]he whole scheme was so
contrived with checks and balances, that the governmental action should be steady,
the changes gradual, and progress uniform." (quoting JOHN NORTON POMEROY,
AN INTRODUCTION TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 86

(1868))).
3 See, e.g., Derek W. Black, The Contradiction Between Equal Protection's
Meaning and Its Legal Substances: How Deliberate Indifference Can Cure It, 15
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 533, 559 (2006).
4 Direct democracy comes in many forms and varies widely from state to state.
Some distinguish an "initiative" as a measure that citizens originate by petition from
a "referendum" that is legislation originating from a legislature and referred to the
people for a vote. K.K. DuVivier, By Going Wrong All Things Come Right: Using
Alternative Initiatives to Improve Citizen Lawmaking, 63 U. CIN. L. REV. 1185, 1185
n.2, 1191 n.42 (1995). A number of terms are also used to describe the process such
as "plebiscite," "proposition," or "amendment." Id. at 1185 n.2. For purposes of
this Article, the term "initiative" will generically encompass any direct democracy
mechanism that forces a legislature to consider a matter outside the standard
representative process.
5 The states to first adopt the initiative process between 1898 and 1918 include
Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Delaware, Idaho, Illinois, Maine,
Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska,
Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota,
Utah, Washington, and Wyoming. DAVID D. SCHMIDT, CITIZEN LAWMAKERS 1617 (1989); see also K.K. DuVivier, The United States as a Democratic Ideal?
International Lessons in Referendum Democracy, 79 TEMP. L. REV. 821, 830-33
(2006).
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initiate laws either to their representatives or to a direct vote of
the people.6
The initiative process is controversial; some see it as "fastfood government"-unhealthy

fare because it creates laws

quickly, bypassing the slower, more deliberative legislative
7
process. Other commentators have argued that initiatives are
especially well suited to bring about progress in the area of
political reform, sidestepping self-interested representatives to
impose term limits or campaign spending limitations when they
have no incentive to make such changes legislatively.8 Similarly,

initiatives can be a mechanism to advance social reform.
Particularly at nascent stages, these types of controversial
reforms may be difficult to navigate through the legislative
process. Citizen initiatives will often be the only available
method for altering the legal regime to advance these reforms.
This Article will focus on the benefits of initiatives in
contributing to one of the goals of federalism: fostering
innovation by allowing the states to serve as Brandeis
laboratories. Addressing controversial issues through "fast6 The initiative right was lost in some of the original states, and a handful of states
and the District of Columbia added initiatives between 1956 and 1977. The
following states currently allow some form of initiative: Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas,
California, Colorado, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon,
South Dakota, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming. See DAVID B. MAGLEBY,
DIRECr LEGISLATION 36 (1984); Nathaniel A. Persily, The PeculiarGeography of
Direct Democracy: Why the Initiative, Referendum and Recall Developed in the
American West, 2 MICH. L. & POL'Y REV. 11, 15 (1997).
7 "We live in a society of instant gratification, but our government was designed
by the Founders to be slow and deliberative. The initiative process is just fast-food
government for people who don't want to follow the standard political process."
Brandon C. Shaffer, Colo. State Senator, What Is the Political and Legal Future of
Colorado's Initiative?, Remarks at the University of Colorado School of Law's 14th
Ira C. Rothgerber, Jr. Conference, The Voice of the Crowd-Colorado's Initiative
Process (Jan. 26, 2007).
8 See, e.g., Lynn A. Baker, Preferences,Priorities,and Plebiscites,13 J. CONTEMP.
LEGAL ISSUES 317, 334-36 (2004); Sherman J. Clark, The Character of Direct
Democracy, 13 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 341, 347-48 (2004); Richard L. Hasen,
Comments on Baker, Clark, and Direct Democracy, 13 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES
563, 564 (2004).
9 The concept of "states as laboratories" comes from Justice Brandeis's dissent in
New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262 (1932). Justice Brandeis stated:
There must be power in the states and the nation to remould, through
experimentation, our economic practices and institutions to meet changing
social and economic needs....
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food government" can promote the evolution of innovation.

Because initiatives have been the first, or sometimes the only,
successful mechanisms for addressing some progressive issues,
they illustrate the benefits of this dispersed form of federalism.
The debate over physician-assisted death, or PAD,' 0 provides

a concrete illustration. Even though a majority of Americans
support the right of patients to make their own decisions about
end-of-life care, including the right to choose death, some

religious and other interest groups have influenced the
traditional legislative process to prevent PAD legislation from
becoming law. Only one state, Oregon, has successfully passed a
PAD law, and this success was through the fast-food initiative
process. Oregon may now serve as a Brandeis laboratory to help
the entire country address the controversial issue of PAD.
While Part I of this Article provides a framework for the debate,

Part II illustrates the significant role the initiative process can
play in promoting this valuable benefit of federalism.
*.. It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single
courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try
novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the
country.
Id. at 311 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
10 This Article focuses on the process of enacting legislation rather than on the
particular form of physician-assisted death ("PAD"). Consequently, throughout
the Article, the generic term PAD refers to the most widely accepted form: (1)
voluntary use (2) by mentally competent patients (3) who are terminally ill (4) of
legal drugs prescribed to them by licensed physicians (5) to hasten death. In
contrast to "euthanasia," "physician-assisted suicide," or "death with dignity," PAD
is a value-neutral term now encouraged by the American Psychological Association.
See Valerie J. Vollmar, Recent Developments in Physician-Assisted Death (May
2007), http://www.willamette.edu/wucl/pdf/pas/2007-05.pdf [hereinafter Vollmar,
May 2007 Developments] ("[T]he reasoning on which a terminally ill person (whose
judgments are not impaired by mental disorders) bases a decision to end his or her
life is fundamentally different from the reasoning a clinically depressed person uses
to justify suicide.").
It is also encouraged by the American Public Health Association (urging
"accurate, value-neutral terms such as 'aid in dying' or 'patient directed dying'),
and the American Academy of Hospice and Palliative Medicine (noting PAD
"'captures the essence of the process in a more accurately descriptive fashion than
the more emotionally charged designation' of physician-assisted suicide"). Id.; see
also Stephen W. Smith, Book Review, 13 MED. L. REV. 286, 287 (2005) (arguing
that the media routinely confused the issue of PAD with the practice of euthanasia,
creating negative images); Don Colburn, Oregon Officials Seek Neutral Term for
"Assisted Suicide," NEWHOUSE NEWS SERVICE, Nov. 15, 2006. Furthermore, in
this Article, I will not specifically address the issue of "palliative care," which allows
a physician to administer pain relief instead of curative treatment to terminally ill
patients. See infra notes 155-63 and accompanying text.
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I
FEDERALISM AND DIRECT DEMOCRACY

"Federalism," a mantra frequently voiced by U.S. politicians
and judges, is the "constitutional balance between the States and

the Federal Government" " that makes the U.S. political system
exemplary. 12 Federalism contemplates a key role for local as

well as national authority, but because of the modern
centralization of power at the federal level, some3 commentators
debate whether the construct has any true value.
As originally configured, the Constitution "split the atom of
sovereignty"'' 4 in the new nation by granting the federal
government limited, "enumerated" powers and reserving to the
states the remaining authority to regulate the affairs of their
citizens.' 5 However, that balance has been disrupted: the
federal government's commerce power has metastasized to
consume nearly every semblance of state authority. 16 Before

1937, the Supreme Court resisted expansion of Commerce
Clause authority, fearing it would leave "nothing left to the
realm of state police regulation.' ' 17 However, the Court threw in
11 Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 255 (2006).
12 See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 187 (1992) ("[Tjhe Constitution
protects us from our own best intentions: It divides power among sovereigns and
among branches of government precisely so that we may resist the temptation to
concentrate power in one location as an expedient solution to the crisis of the
day."); see also Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457-60 (1991) (cataloguing the
benefits of the federal structure).
13 See, e.g., Barry Friedman, Valuing Federalism, 82 MINN. L. REV. 317, 317
(1997).
14 U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
15 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; U.S. CONST. amend. X ("The powers not delegated
to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are
reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."); see also Larry Kramer,
Understanding Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1485, 1490-91, 1495 n.18 (1994)
(arguing that there was consensus among the Framers that the powers of the
national government would be limited).
16 For a wonderful synopsis of the progression, see Friedman, supra note 13, at
328-38.
17 Id. at 333; see, e.g., A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S.
495, 546 (1935) ("If the commerce clause were construed to reach all enterprises
and transactions which could be said to have an indirect effect upon interstate
commerce, the federal authority would embrace practically all the activities of the
people and the authority of the State over its domestic concerns would exist only by
sufferance of the federal government."); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 272-
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the towel in NLRB v. Jones and Laughlin Steel Corp.,18
expanding the federal commerce power "beyond judicially
enforceable limits."' 9
In the last few decades, the Court's decisions have contained
rhetoric about the value of federalism as a guiding principle

while "accord[ing] barely any weight to the state side of the
federalism balance., 20 Yet, the Constitution provides that the
powers not explicitly delegated to the federal government have
been "reserved to the states respectively, or to the people, 21 and
73 (1918), overruled in part by United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) ("If it
were otherwise, all manufacture intended for interstate shipment would be brought
under federal control to the practical exclusion of the authority of the States, a
result certainly not contemplated by the framers of the Constitution when they
vested in Congress the authority to regulate commerce among the States."); United
States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 19 (1895) ("Undoubtedly, the preservation of
the just authority of the States is an object of deep concern to every lover of his
country. No greater calamity could befall our free institutions than the destruction
of that authority, by whatever means such a result might be accomplished.").
18 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
19 Friedman, supra note 13, at 334; see also id. at 334-35 n.69 (citing Vincent A.
Cirillo & Jay W. Eisenhofer, Reflections on the CongressionalCommerce Power, 60
TEMP. L.Q. 901, 912 (1987) (stating that during the New Deal, "the congressional
commerce power emerged as a virtually unlimited power and, in effect, became the
national police power rejected by the Framers at the Constitutional Convention");
Jonathan L. Entin, The New Federalism After United States v. Lopez, 46 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 635, 636 (1996) ("The Court struggled ... for more than a century
before the New Deal transformation ushered in a doctrinal structure suggesting that
there were no judicially enforceable limits on the commerce power."); Richard A.
Epstein, The Proper Scope of the Commerce Power, 73 VA. L. REV. 1387, 1451
(1987) (arguing that the New Deal Supreme Court "rejected the idea of limited
federal government and decentralized power" in favor of a centralized government
acting for the public welfare); Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure
Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108
HARV. L. REV. 1221, 1259 (1995) ("In addition, since the New Deal 'switch,' the
Commerce Clause power in particular has been understood to be remarkably
inclusive. Consequently, the universe of legitimate ends has expanded to such a
degree that it now seems almost brazen to suggest that there is anything Congress
may not do.")).
20 Id. at 321-22.
21 U.S. CONST. amend. X; see also U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S.
779, 847-48 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas stated:
In each State, the remainder of the people's powers-"[t]he powers not
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to
the States,"-are either delegated to the state government or retained by
the people....
These basic principles are enshrined in the Tenth Amendment, which
declares that all powers neither delegated to the Federal Government nor
prohibited to the States "are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
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federalism contemplates dispersal of power and some role for

the states within the federal system.
In a few instances, the Supreme Court has begun to articulate
the benefit of shifting some weight back to state-side deference. 22
While the Court has declared it "unwise to attempt to identify a
list of 'traditional' state functions, '' 23 the federalization of issues

traditionally identified as local matters, such as crime, has
brought criticism.24 Likewise, the balance has also shifted in the
areas of economics, the environment, and civil rights. In the last
century, many problems were "best solved at the national

people." With this careful last phrase, the Amendment avoids taking any
position on the division of power between the state governments and the
people of the States: It is up to the people of each State to determine
which "reserved" powers their state government may exercise. But the
Amendment does make clear that powers reside at the state level except
where the Constitution removes them from that level. All powers that the
Constitution neither delegates to the Federal Government nor prohibits to
the States are controlled by the people of each State.
Id. (first alteration in original) (citation omitted).
22 See Freidman, supra note 13, at 363; see also id. at 363 n.203 (citing Garcia v.
San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 575-76 (1985) (Powell, J.,
dissenting) (discussing how state and local governments are better able than the
national government to perform activities that affect the everyday lives of citizens)).
Justice Powell noted:
State and local officials of course must be intimately familiar with
[traditionally local] services and sensitive to their quality as well as cost.
Such officials also know that their constituents and the press respond to the
adequacy, fair distribution, and cost of these services. It is this kind of state
and local control and accountability that the Framers understood would
insure the vitality and preservation of the federal system that the
Constitution explicitly requires.
Garcia,469 U.S. at 578-79.
23 Friedman, supra note 13, at 361; see id. at 361 n.189 ("We therefore now reject,
as unsound in principle and unworkable in practice, a rule of state immunity from
federal regulation that turns on a judicial appraisal of whether a particular
governmental function is 'integral' or 'traditional.'
Any such rule leads to
inconsistent results at the same time that it disserves principles of democratic selfgovernance, and it breeds inconsistency precisely because it is divorced from those
principles." (quoting Garcia, 469 U.S. at 546-47)).
24 See id. at 375; see also id. at 375 n.250 (citing Kathleen F. Brickey, Criminal
Mischief. The Federalization of American Criminal Law, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1135,
1166-72 (1995) (arguing that Congress must exercise restraint in federalizing
criminal law); Thomas M. Mengler, The Sad Refrain of Tough on Crime: Some
Thoughts on Saving the FederalJudiciaryfrom the Federalizationof State Crime, 43
U. KAN. L. REV. 503, 506 (1995) (expressing the belief that "many matters of 'local
concern' are presently being federalized by Congress")).
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level, 25 but more recently, local action has led the way on
economic and environmental issues.26 In addition, many state

constitutions now afford greater civil rights protections for
citizens than they enjoy under the Federal Constitution. 27

Placing more weight on the state side of the federalism
equation has a number of advantages. For one, it helps avoid

dissatisfaction with a remote federal government. Proponents of
"anti-nationalizing movements . . . reflect[] unease among the
people about the extent to which governmental authority is
slipping from their grasp.,

28

Respect for state authority under

the concept of federalism can assuage those who bristle because29
of the "disadvantages [of] overweening national authority.,
Initiatives force local representatives to be in touch directly with
their constituents' desires. Thus, the initiative process can be

25 Id. at 367 (referencing the civil rights advantages); see also id. at 374 (listing the
areas of environmentalism and consumerism in addition to civil rights). Initiative
advocates also called for a Constitutional Amendment to create a National
Initiative in the late 1970s. See, e.g., LAURA TALLIAN, DIRECT DEMOCRACY 12021 (1977). However, that movement appears to have almost completely died.
DuVivier, supra note 5, at 867.
26 For example, New Hampshire residents are voting on a state referendum
addressing global climate change. Katie Zezima, In New Hampshire, Towns Put
Climate on the Agenda, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2007, at A8. Kurt Ehrenberg, from
the Sierra Club's New Hampshire office, noted that "the lack of federal leadership
on this issue [has] forced people to find a solution on the local level." Id. In the
United States, concern about the democracy deficit has been expressed frequently
in the context of environmental law. See Freidman, supra note 13, at 392 (citing
Michael P. Vandenbergh, An Alternative to Ready, Fire,Aim: A New Framework to
Link Environmental Targets in Environmental Law, 85 KY. L.J. 803, 849-54 (199697)); id. at 392 n.317 ("By regulating vital decisions about environmental risk
management through a remote, arcane, and piecemeal bureaucratic process, the
command and control system necessarily runs a serious democracy deficit."
(quoting Richard B. Stewart, United States Environmental Regulation: A Failing
Paradigm,15 J.L. & COM. 585, 590 (1996))). But see id. at 318 n.4 (citing Daniel C.
Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95 MICH. L. REV. 570, 648-52 (1996)
(arguing that the participation of uninformed citizens in environmental regulatory
judgments is of dubious value)).
27 James M. Hoefler, Diffusion and Diversity: Federalismand the Right to Die in
the Fifty States, 24 PUBLIUS 153, 160 (1994) (noting the "trend in state courts to hold
minimum levels of constitutional protections set by the U.S. Supreme Court to be
insufficient to satisfy state standards of constitutional rights"); see also S. Candice
Hoke, Transcending Conventional Supremacy: A Reconstruction of the Supremacy
Clause, 24 CONN. L. REV. 829, 890 (1992) ("Even in the area of civil rights, it is no
longer apparent that federal law will afford individuals more protection than the
laws of their states.").
28 Friedman, supra note 13, at 379.
29 Id. at 384.
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one of the most effective mechanisms for promoting federalism,
30
resulting in a more responsive and robust form of democracy.
Furthermore, surrendering total authority to distant
representatives not only weakens accountability but also can
promote dishonesty.3 ' Allocating more power back to the state
side of the federalism equation may address "the clear loss of
faith in democracy many in this country feel" due to "the
corrupting influence of interest groups and money in the
national Congress., 32 Initiatives can be a salutary response to
the voters' "disenchantment, 33 with corruption in government
and satisfy federalism's focus on more local participation.
Finally, federalism allows states to act as laboratories.
Centralization at the federal level can stifle innovation, with
congressional "stasis" preventing any positive action from that
national legislative body.34 Instead, dispersing power to the
states encourages the evolution of ideas that can help advance an
issue nationally. The "evolutionary process"
•
35 of "innovation"
works best when experimentation is diffused. More progress is
likely when "fifty different parallel state governments and
countless substate governments" are working on possible
solutions to problems that face the nation.36 Some of these ideas
will be rejected, but the odds improve with the existence of
multiple, creative options.
A. State Legislative Processes
The traditional deliberative process for legislation from
representatives was designed to allow gradual, rather than
abrupt, change. An executive, small groups of legislators, or
sometimes a single legislator can halt the progress of laws at any
30 See Scheiber, supra note 1, at 787 (praising "the tradition that finds in the
people themselves the source of legitimacy for both constitutional foundations and
the ongoing governance of the state polity").
31 See TALLIAN, supra note 25, at 25.
32 Friedman, supra note 13, at 384.
33 Id. at 390 ("Indeed, intuition suggests that disenchantment with government
and anemic levels of citizen participation in democracy positively correlate with
nationalizing trends. . . . Intuition suggests that more people would and could
participate in smaller levels of government ....
.
34 Id. at 384.
35 Id. at 399-400.
36 See id. at 398-400.
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one of several pressure points throughout the process to
encourage compromise between minority and majority views.
Although these pressure points have advantages in many
situations, influential minority interests sometimes can
manipulate the process to create gridlock on controversial issues
they oppose on moral grounds. In contrast, laws created by

citizen initiatives bypass these pressure points in the traditional
legislative process. In some cases, this lack of minority
protection is problematic. However, for innovative experiments
opposed by religious minorities, the fast-food initiative process
may be the only mechanism for allowing legislation to move

forward.
1. PressurePoints in the TraditionalLegislative Process
The U.S. legislative process is notoriously inefficient. 37 Based

on James Madison's vision to pit "factions" against one another
to force compromise,3 8 the process attempts to filter out
37 See id. at 388; see also id. at 388 n.301 ("[I]t is crystal clear from the records of
the Convention, contemporaneous writings and debates, that the Framers ranked
other values higher than efficiency." (quoting INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 958-59
(1983))); Richard D. Marks, High Technology Legislation as an Eighteenth Century
Process, 6 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 17, 18 (1994). Marks notes that:
Generalizations are risky, but it still is fair to say that the legislative process
of the United States is designed to be inefficient in the short run. Checks
and balances, and the concomitant need to build political coalitions, result
in a slower decision-making process, at least in comparison to less
democratic forms.
Id.
38 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 132-33 (James Madison) (Benjamin Fletcher
Wright ed., 1996). Madison wrote:
If a faction consists of less than a majority, relief is supplied by the
republican principle, which enables the majority to defeat its sinister views
by regular vote. It may clog the administration, it may convulse the
society; but it will be unable to execute and mask its violence under the
forms of the Constitution. When a majority is included in a faction, the
form of popular government, on the other hand, enables it to sacrifice to its
ruling passion or interest both the public good and the rights of other
citizens. To secure the public good and private rights against the danger of
such a faction, and at the same time to preserve the spirit and the form of
popular government, is then the great object to which our inquiries are
directed. Let me add that it is the great desideratum by which this form of
government can be rescued from the opprobrium under which it has so
long labored, and be recommended to the esteem and adoption of
mankind.
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extremes and bring parties toward a middle ground. 39 Although
the goal is to achieve gradual, rather than abrupt, change, n°

sometimes minority interests can exploit the process so that the
result is gridlock instead of any progress at all on an issue.
Pressure points throughout the legislative process permit

minority factions to strategically assert influence to stop the flow
of legislation.41

Individual legislators can assert pressure to

defeat a bill by assigning it to an unreceptive committee or by
scheduling so it never comes to a vote before the full chamber.
In addition, the national Congress and all of the state legislatures
but one are bicameral; thus a few representatives in one of the

two separate legislative chambers can assert pressure in their
own chamber to defeat legislation passed by the other legislative
chamber.

Similarly, bills

that successfully

pass through

committee hearings and the multiple votes of both chambers of a
legislature still may be halted at the executive level by a
presidential or gubernatorial veto.43
39 See Christopher M. Pietruszkiewicz, Discarded Deference:
Judicial
Independence in Informal Agency Guidance, 74 TENN. L. REV. 1, 36 n.252 (2006)
("By its very nature, the legislative process is one of mediation, compromise, and
reconciliation of differing views and opinions." (quoting Linda Galler, Emerging
Standards for Judicial Review of IRS Revenue Rulings, B.U. L. REV. 841, 879
(1992))).
40 Bruce Ackerman, The New Separationof Powers, 113 HARV. L. REV. 633, 722
n.213 (2000) ("The traditional liberal justification of bicameralism is that it slows
down the legislative process, renders abrupt change difficult, forces myopic
legislators to have second thoughts, and thereby minimizes arbitrariness and
injustice in governmental action." (quoting William H. Riker, The Justification of
Bicameralism, 13 INT'L POL. SCI. REV. 101, 101 (1992))); see also Elizabeth R.
Leong, Ballot Initiatives & Identifiable Minorities: A Textual Call to Congress, 28
RUTGERS L.J. 677, 685-91 (1997); Glen Staszewski, Rejecting the Myth of Popular
Sovereignty and Applying an Agency Model to Direct Democracy, 56 VAND. L.
REV. 395, 401-04 (2003).
41 Some scholars have identified these mechanisms for filtering out undesirable
outcomes in the legislative process as "vetogates."
See LARRY I. PALMER,
ENDINGS AND BEGINNINGS: LAW, MEDICINE, AND SOCIETY IN ASSISTED LIFE
AND DEATH 108 (2000).
42 Nebraska voters converted their state legislature from a bicameral to a

unicameral system through an initiative in 1934. History of the Nebraska
Unicameral, www.unicam.state.ne.us/web/public/history (last visited June 4, 2007).
Although twenty-one other states also attempted to switch to unicameral systems in
the 1930s, these efforts failed. Interest in unicameral legislatures revived in the
1960s, but no state government other than Nebraska currently uses this form. Id.
43 See Leong, supra note 40, at 685-86. Leong writes:
We are familiar with the Constitution's fine-tuned system of
deliberative democracy. An initiative process would have been wholly
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Thus, pressure-point inefficiency may contribute to more
moderate laws in some instances, but in others, it does not work
so tidily and can become a recipe for gridlock. 4 The existence of
these pressure points also makes legislators especially
susceptible to party pressures and special interests. Interest
groups need only influence the process at one of the critical
junctures, and progress grinds to a halt.
2. The Citizen Initiative Process
Dissatisfaction with an entirely representative form of
government reached a turning point during the Progressive era
in the late 1800s.
In response to intransient and corrupt
legislatures, 6 the Progressives proposed citizen initiatives as an
foreign to the framers, who structured the legislative process in a
thoroughly inefficient, though ingeniously deliberative, manner: (1) a
bicameral legislature expected to deliberate and pass on each proposed bill;
(2) a Chief Executive permitted to veto all legislative enactments complete
with his articulated reasons; and (3) the ability of both houses to override
that veto by a supermajority vote. The Constitution's divided processes of
federal legislation supply a probative model of what republican
government is: structural opportunities for a minority faction to alter the
outcome or impact of a majority's bare desire or tendency to harm.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
44 As Germany's first chancellor, Otto Von Bismarck, famously quipped: "Laws
are like sausages, it is better not to see them being made." Tracey E. George &
Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., How Is ConstitutionalLaw Made?, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1265,
1265 (2002) (quoting 1,911 BEST THINGS ANYBODY EVER SAID 232 (Robert Byrne
ed., 1988)).
45 THOMAS M. DURBIN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., REF. NO. 81-63A,
INITIATIVE, REFERENDUM AND RECALL:

A RESUME OF STATE PROVISIONS 3

(1981). In addition to the initiative and referendum process, the Progressive
movement sought a number of political reforms, including secret ballots, direct
election of U.S. senators, primary elections, and women's suffrage. THOMAS
GOEBEL, A GOVERNMENT BY THE PEOPLE: DIRECT DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA
1890-1940, at 3-4 (2002). Some also recognize the movement as that of the Populist
party as well as the Progressives. The Populist platform of 1892 affirmed support
for direct legislation and the National Direct Legislation League. TALLIAN, supra
note 25, at 35-36.
46 M.

DANE

WATERS,

A

BRIEF

HISTORY

OF

THE

INITIATIVE

AND

REFERENDUM PROCESS IN THE UNITED STATES 3 (2003), http://www
.iandrinstitute.org/New%20IRI%20Website%2OInfo/Drop%2ODown%20Boxes/Q
uick%20Facts/History%20of%20I&R.pdf; see also GOEBEL, supra note 45, at 4
(noting that the direct democracy movement typically has been interpreted as
response to perceived influence of special interest groups on legislatures). In
California, the initiative was introduced to wrest control of the state government
from the Southern Pacific Company. See James E. Castello, Comment, The Limits
of Popular Sovereignty: Using the Initiative Power to Control Legislative Procedure,
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The Progressives

argued that initiatives could correct the control of government
by moneyed interests 48 and could force action when elected

officials became "paralyzed by inaction. 4 9 Woodrow Wilson
studied initiatives as an academic before he ran for president,
and after initial skepticism, became an initiative convert, praising

the process as the "gun behind the door, 50 and "a sobering
means of obtaining51genuine representative action on the part of
legislative bodies.,
Currently, twenty-three states allow citizen initiatives to
create law outside of the traditional legislative process.52 The

citizen initiative process is controversial.53 Critics have argued
74 CAL. L. REV. 491, 503-04 (1986) (describing amendment of the California
Constitution to authorize referendum and initiative immediately following election
of reform movement's "standard bearer" Hiram Johnson as governor).
47 See, e.g., Beall v. State ex rel. Jenkins, 103 A. 99, 102-03 (Md. 1917) (opining
that Maryland and other states amended their constitutions to provide for
referendum veto of legislation in order to eliminate alleged control and corruption
by "great corporations" and political parties); State ex rel. Mullen v. Howell, 181 P.
920, 922 (Wash. 1919) (opining that citizens asserted referendum power due to
perception that legislature had become unresponsive to popular will). One New
Jersey reformer concluded that "representative government is a failure." GOEBEL,
supra note 45, at 36. On another occasion, supporters of direct legislation by the
electorate characterized representative government as an "utter failure," stating
that "[iut fails in the leaders it develops; it fails in its mechanism[;] [i]t is cumbrous,
uncertain, confused, irresponsible, undemocratic, often farcical and dishonest, and
commonly partisan." Id. at 207 n.35.
48 The Progressives also argued the initiative could "take back government from
the special interests." Scheiber, supra note 1, at 790; see id. ("As Senator Jonathan
Bourne, Jr., of Oregon declared in 1912, [the initiative was needed] 'to restore the
sovereignty of the people[,] [t]o educate and develop the people[,J [t]o secure
legislation for the general welfare[,] [t]o prevent legislation against the general
welfare[,] [tlo eliminate the legislative blackmailer[, and] [tJo make our legislative
bodies truly representative."' (quoting Jonathan Bourne, Jr., Functions of the
Initiative, Referendum and Recall, 43 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. SC1. 3, 3
(1912) (alterations in original))); see also GOEBEL, supra note 45, at 4 (noting that
the direct democracy movement is typically interpreted as response to perceived
influence of special interest groups on legislatures); WATERS, supra note 46, at 3.
49 WATERS, supra note 46, at 2.
50 GOEBEL, supra note 45, at 55.
51 Scheiber, supra note 1, at 793 (quoting Woodrow Wilson, The Issues of Reform,
in THE INITIATIVE, REFERENDUM AND RECALL 69, 88 (William Bennett Munro
ed., 1912)).
52 See supra note 6.
53 For example, many authors suggest different standards for judicial review of
initiatives than for legislative enactments. Although it is beyond the scope of this
Article to address judicial review of any PAD laws enacted by initiative, some
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that initiatives produce inferior law because they do not allow
the fine tuning produced by a trip through the traditional
legislative process.54 This criticism is especially appropriate

when initiatives attempt to address complex fiscal questions with
a yes or no vote.55
Also, initiatives are frequently maligned for allowing
oppression of unpopular minorities.
In the early 1900s,
authors have suggested deference to initiative-made laws. See, e.g., K.K. DuVivier,
State Ballot Initiatives in the Federal Preemption Equation: A Medical Marijuana
Case Study, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 221, 223-27 (2005) (discussing a heightened
presumption against preemption). Others have argued for greater scrutiny. See,
e.g., Julian N. Eule, JudicialReview of DirectDemocracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1503, 154851 (1990) (urging heightened scrutiny of laws enacted by initiatives and
referendums); see also Philip P. Frickey, Interpretation on the Borderline:
Constitution, Canons, Direct Democracy, 1996 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 477, 494-504
(creating "quasi-constitutional canons of statutory interpretation" to interpret
direct democracy enactments); Jane S. Schacter, The Pursuit of "Popular Intent":
Interpretive Dilemmas in Direct Democracy, 105 YALE L.J. 107, 123-29 (1995)
(criticizing judicial efforts to divine legislative intent when interpreting ballot
measures); Note, Judicial Approaches to Direct Democracy, 118 HARV. L. REV.
2748, 2755-57 (2005). Yet a third group argues for no difference. See, e.g., Eule,
supra, at 1505 n.5 (Although Eule argues for heightened scrutiny, his work collects
citations to Supreme Court cases recognizing popular enactment of a law at issue
yet refusing to interpret it any differently because of the method of enactment); see
also JudicialApproaches to Direct Democracy, supra, at 2760-62.
54 See, e.g., Eule, supra note 53, at 1520, 1527, 1555; Elizabeth Garrett, Who
Directs Direct Democracy?,4 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 17, 20 (1997); Hans A.
Linde, On Reconstituting "Republican Government," 19 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV.
193,204-06 (1994) ("When groups or individuals can bypass deliberative bodies and
enact these passions by plebiscite, the state departs from republican lawmaking.").
55 See, e.g., DuVivier, supra note 53, at 246 (describing the budget crisis in
Colorado when voters passed conflicting funding initiatives); Mildred Wigfall
Robinson, Difficulties in Achieving Coherent State and Local Fiscal Policy at the
Intersection of DirectDemocracy and Republicanism: The Property Tax as a Case in
Point, 35 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 511, 543 (2002); Judicial Approaches to Direct
Democracy, supra note 53, at 2759 ("[Ilts myopic focus creates difficulty for a
legislature that is responsible for taking a more holistic view of the state's fiscal
responsibilities."); id. (also noting that California's Proposition 13 "wreak[ed] havoc
[on] state finances" and the "three strikes" criminal law had fiscal implications
because of the larger prison population).
56 Barbara S. Gamble, Putting Civil Rights to a Popular Vote, 41 AM. J. POL. SCI.
245, 245-46 (1997) (finding empirically that initiatives that restrict civil rights have
been approved seventy-five percent of the time in contrast to the approximate
thirty-three percent approval success of all initiatives historically); see also Lynn A.
Baker, Direct Democracy and Discrimination: A Public Choice Perspective, 67
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 707, 712-15 (1992); Derrick A. Bell, Jr., The Referendum:
Democracy's Barrier to Racial Equality, 54 WASH. L. REV. 1, 2-9 (1978); Sherman
J. Clark, A Populist Critique of Direct Democracy, 112 HARV. L. REV. 434, 473-75
(1998); Hans A. Linde, When Initiative Lawmaking Is Not "Republican
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initiatives were used to disenfranchise African American citizens
in the South and to restrict the ability of Asian Americans to
hold land in California.57 Recent initiatives attempting to restrict
gay rights and denying services to illegal immigrants perpetuate
the initiative's ugly legacy in this area.
Fortunately, many
initiatives that attempted to infringe civil rights have been
defeated,59 and among those that have been enacted, many have

Government": The Campaign Against Homosexuality, 72 OR. L. REV. 19, 34-37
(1993); Cass R. Sunstein, Public Values, Private Interests, and the Equal Protection
Clause, 1982 SUP. CT. REV. 127, 150-57 (1983); Sylvia R. Lazos Vargas, Judicial
Review of Initiatives and Referendums in Which Majorities Vote on Minorities'
Democratic Citizenship, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 399, 421-25 (1999); Priscilla F. Gunn,
Note, Initiatives and Referendums: Direct Democracy and Minority Interests, 22
URB. L. ANN. 135, 158 (1981). But cf. Ronald J.Allen, The National Initiative
Proposal: A PreliminaryAnalysis, 58 NEB. L. REV. 965, 1021 (1979) (noting that
"[t]he history of the initiative is remarkably free of the enactment of abusive
legislation").
57 See Scheiber, supra note 1, at 795 (discussing California's Alien Land Law,
Proposition 1, in 1920); see also Janice C. May, The Constitutional Initiative: A
Threat to Rights?, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE STATES 163, 171-72 (Stanley H.
Friedelbaum ed., 1988).
58 For example, California's Proposition 187 attempted to cut services for illegal
aliens, but was declared unconstitutional or preempted by federal law in League of
United Latin American Citizens v. Wilson, 908 F. Supp. 755, 786-87 (C.D. Cal.
1995). A similar measure was passed in Arizona in 2004. Proposition 200 passed by
a margin of fifty-six percent. Richard Marosi, Anti-Immigrant Initiatives Growing,
SEATTLE TIMES, Nov. 6, 2004, at A13. Another was proposed for Colorado in 2006.
Proposed Initiative No. 55 failed to make it on the ballot when the Colorado
Supreme Court determined that it did not meet the requirements of the single
subject rule. Sarah Burnett, "We're Not Giving Up" Initiative Activist Says, ROCKY
MOUNTAIN NEWS, June 13, 2006, at 13A. In 2000, California Proposition 22 sought
to keep gay and lesbian couples from marrying in other states and seeking
recognition of the union in California. Evelyn Nieves, Ballot Initiative That Would
Thwart Gay MarriageIs Embroiling California,N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2000, at A12.
59 AKHIL REED AMAR & ALAN HIRSCH, FOR THE PEOPLE:

WHAT THE

CONSTITUTION REALLY SAYS ABOUT YOUR RIGHTS 38 (1998). One of the
authors has stated:
Indeed, a tiny percentage of proposed initiatives are aimed at restricting
civil rights, and most of these are defeated. Citizens have used direct
democracy less to oppress vulnerable minorities than to (i) reform
government processes through campaign finance laws, restrictions on
lobbying, and conflict of interest statutes, (ii) restrict their tax burden, and
(iii) protect the environment.
DuVivier, supra note 53, at 243 n.110 (quoting Alan Hirsch, Direct Democracy and
Civic Maturation, 29 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 185, 206-07 n.110 (2002) (citations
omitted)).

2007]

Fast-Food Government and Physician-AssistedDeath

been invalidated by the courts. 6 0 Furthermore, the traditional
legislative process can result in similar oppression, and there is
evidence that legislation enacted through "the deliberative
process does not systematically create fewer discriminatory
laws. ,,61
The initiative process has many detractors, and even those

who appreciate its advantages acknowledge that its use has been
62

problematic in some situations.
Despite the criticism, the
initiative process is wildly popular with voters. During the 1981
to 1990 decade, U.S. voters placed a record 274 initiatives and
referendums on state ballots nationwide. The following decade,
the number rose to another record of 391 statewide measures. 63
The upward trend appears to be continuing with more initiatives
on state ballots every year. 64 Furthermore, the relatively few

initiatives that may have tainted the process for some should not
60 See, e.g., COLO. CONST. art. II, § 30b (1992); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 623
(1996) (finding that an initiative passed by Colorado voters in 1992, known as
Amendment 2, which invalidated antidiscrimination protections on the basis of
sexual orientation enacted by local governments, violated Equal Protection).
61 DuVivier, supra note 53, at 243.
62 It fosters reactions of "serious concern to outright disillusionment, and
oftentimes sheer despair." Scheiber, supra note 1, at 789. However, it also "play[s]
a positive role in increasing electoral participation" and "has become a preferred
mechanism of governing .. .the state's most important policies." Caroline J.
Tolbert et al., The Effects of Ballot Initiatives on Voter Turnout in the American
States, 29 AM. POL. RES. 625, 625 (2001); see also DuVivier, supra note 53, at 22123,235-48.
63 Overview of Initiative Use, 1904-2006, INITIATIVE USE (Initiative &
Referendum Inst., L.A., Cal.), Nov. 2002, at 1, 2, http://www.iandrinstitute.org/
IRI%20Initiative%20Use%20(2006-11).pdf.
The resurgence of the initiative
process, after a decline in the 1940s through 1960s, is often credited to California's
Proposition 13. Jim Wasserman, Tax-Cutting Proposition 13 Sparked Revolt,
DENVER POST, June 2, 2003, at 6A. In a February 2003 poll by the Public Policy
Institute of California, sixty-five percent of homeowners say the proposition was
"mostly a good thing for California." MARK BALDASSARE, PUB. POL. INST. OF
CAL., PPIC STATEWIDE SURVEY:

CALIFORNIANS AND THEIR GOVERNMENT 10

(2003), availableat http://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/survey/S_203MBS.pdf.
64 A total of 204 measures appeared on the ballots of thirty-seven states during
the 2006 midterm elections, an increase from the 162 measures on ballots during the
2004 election. Election Results 2006, BALLOT WATCH (Initiative & Referendum
Inst., L.A., Cal.), Nov. 2006, at 1, 1, http://www.iandrinstitute.org/BW%2020065%20(Election%20results-update).pdf. "A total of 2,231 state-level initiatives have
been on the ballot since the first one went before the voters in Oregon in 1904, and
909 (41 percent) have been approved." Overview of Initiative Use, supra note 63, at
1. See generally, K.K. DuVivier, Out of the Bottle: The Genie of Direct Democracy,
70 ALB. L. REV. 1045 (2007) (describing the popularity of initiatives and the spread
of their use to influence candidate elections).
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serve to render initiatives "categorically suspect. ''65 Instead, it is
valuable to consider the positive role initiatives have played in
the past and still can play in the context of federalism.
B. The Benefit of Fast-FoodInitiativesfor Innovation

One of the biggest advantages of citizen initiatives is that they
avoid many of the deficiencies of the legislative process. Few
would want to eat at McDonalds all the time, but in some
situations, fast food may be the best option. Similarly, fast-food
government is a mechanism for the people to get action when
legislatures are unwilling to respond for social or political
reasons. As Theodore Roosevelt noted: "I believe in the
initiative and referendum, which should be used not to destroy
representative government, but to correct it whenever it
becomes misrepresentative." 66
Legislators personally benefit from infusions of additional
money to their campaigns, so they have an incentive to appease
large campaign contributors. 67 Furthermore, legislators cannot
always vote their personal convictions on legislation without fear
of repercussions for voting against party lines.6 Consequently,
sophisticated donors need only make contributions to party
leaders and strategic legislators to manipulate the pressure
points in the traditional process and improve their odds for
favorable legislative outcomes.
In contrast, the initiative process was designed specifically to
address the problems with representative governments that have
stalled. While initiatives may suffer from some of the same
shortcomings as the legislative process,69 they are less susceptible
65 JudicialApproachesto DirectDemocracy, supra note 53, at 2765-66.
66 Theodore Roosevelt, A Charter of Democracy, Address Before the Ohio
Constitutional Convention (Feb. 12, 1912), in POLITICS AND PEOPLE: THE
ORDEAL OF SELF-GOVERNMENT IN AMERICA 180 (Leon Sein et al. eds., 1974).

67 DuVivier, supra note 53, at 245-46.
68 Id. at 247; see also AMAR & HIRSCH, supra note 59, at 39.
69 DuVivier, supra note 53, at 240-48; see also BETTY H. ZISK, MONEY, MEDIA,
AND THE GRASS ROOTS 108-09 (1987); DuVivier, supra note 64, at 1048 n.15;
Elizabeth Garrett, Money, Agenda Setting, and DirectDemocracy, 77 TEX. L. REV.

1845, 1849 (1999); Clayton P. Gillette, Is Direct Democracy Anti-Democratic?, 34
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 609, 622-24 (1998); Daniel H. Lowenstein, Campaign
Spending and Ballot Propositions:Recent Experience, Public Choice Theory and the
First Amendment, 29 UCLA L. REV. 505, 517-19 (1982); Randy M. Mastro et al.,
Taking the Initiative: CorporateControl of the Referendum Process Through Media
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interest manipulation

of the pressure

points.

Individual voters do not need to respond to pressure from party
leaders because they may vote by secret ballot and will not suffer
any personal consequences for voting contrary to the party line.70
Similarly, initiatives are no more corrupted by the influence of
money than the traditional legislative process. Minority interest
contributors are more likely to see a direct return for their

donations to legislators whose tenure in office may ride on a
campaign contribution. In contrast, voters receive no direct
financial benefit by choosing for one side or another, so they are
more likely to vote their consciences on an initiative.7 ' Because
most citizens are motivated by good intentions rather than
greed, "big money can kill a ballot measure[;] [b]ut the
corresponding
good news is that big money can't always buy a
'yes' vote. 72
Trust in the "power of the people, 73 as an alternative to
representative government sparked the resurgence of direct
democracy in the late 1960s. For example, the People's Lobby, a
grassroots group, "resurrected and energized California's
previously moribund direct-democracy laws" initially in an
attempt to recall Ronald Reagan, then governor of California.74

Spending and What to Do About It, 32 FED. COMM. L.J. 315, 319-23 (1980); John S.
Shockley, Direct Democracy, Campaign Finance,and the Courts: Can Corruption,
Undue Influence, and Declining Voter Confidence Be Found?, 39 U. MIAMI L. REV.
377, 391-400 (1985).
70 TALLIAN, supra note 25, at 29 (quoting John R. Haynes, The Actual Workings
of the Initiative, Referendum, and Recall, 1 NAT'L MUN. REV. 586, 589 (1912)). The

father of the recall in California worked to get direct democracy in Los Angeles and
then the state twenty-four years before the election of Governor Hiram Johnson
and other representatives sympathetic to the cause who enacted statewide direct
democracy in California in 1910. Id. at 36-38 ("[T]he ordinary legislator often votes
upon scores of questions at a single sitting, amid tumult and uproar, the appeal to
party passion, and to his private pocketbook." (quoting Haynes, supra, at 586)).
71 The desire to vote their consciences also may have a downside on repressive
moral issues; despite contributions by gay-rights activists, voters in eight of nine
states approved same-sex marriage bans in 2006. Karen E. Crummy, A Big Role in
a Fight to Help Gays Wed, DENVER POST, Aug. 7, 2007, at lB. In contrast, these
activists noted that their contributions helped elect "a number of state lawmakers
who support gay rights.., and some are changing laws." Id.
72 Al Knight, Do Initiatives Still Work?
Yes, but They Need Some Repair,
DENVER POST, Dec. 1, 2002, at 1E; see also DuVivier, supra note 64, at 1048-49.
73 TALLIAN, supra note 25, at 118.
74 Matt
Smith, Recalling Reagan, SFWEEKLY.COM, Aug. 27, 2003,
http://www.sfweekly.com/2003-08-27/news/recalling-reagan.

OREGON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 86, 895

The initiative process inspired these individuals to eschew more
futile, and potentially destructive, methods of impacting
government policies and instead provided a constructive
mechanism for those who felt disempowered to seek political
change.75 Without initiatives, the influential "triumphed without
even the need publicly to justify their views., 76 Now both the
right and the left recognize the power of the initiative to
motivate and achieve results, as both the state and local initiative
processes have enjoyed record popularity during the last thirty
years. 77
Fast food is not healthy as daily fare, but it can work well as
part of a complete diet. Similarly, direct democracy is best not
for circumventing legislatures, but instead as a supplemental
means of addressing a "fail[ure] in [the] mechanism., 78 Citizens
may be allowed to "recogniz[e] legislators as specialists in
government," and yet "join in partnership with them to
supplement their work" by registering their preferences not only
during representative elections, but between them.7 9
Federalism encourages the diffusion of power, and the
initiative process illustrates the advantage of this diffusion. The
Supreme Court continues to endorse Justice Brandeis's assertion
that "one of the happy incidents of the federal system" is
allowing a state to "serve as a laboratory[] and try novel ...
experiments without risk to the rest of the country."80 History
75 See TALLIAN, supra note 25, at 117 (noting that more than boycotts and
protest, the "initiative surpasses all other political methods to bring an issue into
sharp focus").
76 Id. at 118.

77 DuVivier, supra note 53, at 235. Although initiatives were initially promoted
by Progressives in the late 1800s and by liberal groups in the late 1960s, they are
now embraced by liberals and conservatives and do not "promote any particular
agenda over another." Id.
78 Representative government "'fails in the leaders it develops; it fails in its
mechanism. It is cumbrous, uncertain, confused, irresponsible, undemocratic, often
farcical and dishonest, and commonly partisan."' GOEBEL, supra note 45, at 206
n.35 (quoting NAT'L DIRECT LEGISLATION LEAGUE, DIRECT LEGISLATION
RECORD I, at 84 (1894)).
79 TALLIAN, supra note 25, at 8.
80 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting), cited in Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 42 (2005) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting), Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 326 (2002), United States v. Oakland
Cannabis Buyers Coop., 532 U.S. 483, 502 (2001) (Stevens, J. dissenting), Smith v.
Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 261 (2000); Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S.
261, 292 (1990).

2007]

Fast-FoodGovernment and Physician-AssistedDeath

has shown that citizen initiatives are some of the best vehicles
for this dispersed experimentation by states.
1. Local Legislative Experimentation
The division of power between national and local authority in

the U.S. Constitution was designed to secure the "people's
rights."''.

This division of power favors local authority to address

experimental issues for at least three reasons.
First, communities themselves, not the federal government,
should have the power to resolve important local issues that do

not impact other states. As the Supreme Court stated in
recognizing one of the benefits of citizen initiatives, "a
more sensitive to the
decentralized government . . . will be 82
society.
heterogeneous
a
of
needs
diverse

Second, allowing state social experimentation sometimes can
result in a national consensus where none previously existed.
The state efforts can signal to Congress that there is widespread

support for a particular measure or, just as importantly,
widespread opposition.

Third, federal control in experimental areas can eliminate any
potential for progress or the resolution of differing views.
Because federal law preempts, "the state is powerless to remove
the ill effects of [a federal] decision., 83 When the U.S.

Constitution or a federal statute speaks on a topic, alternative
state approaches may be curtailed, preventing them from
contributing to a compromise resolution on a controversial topic
that might better reflect a consensus of opinions.m4
81 Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629, 647 (9th Cir. 2002) (Kozinski, J., concurring)
(quoting United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 616 n.7 (2000)) (arguing that
federal regulation in the area of medical marijuana use is inappropriate under basic
principles of federalism and is best left to the states).
82 Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991) (stating that a decentralized
government "increases [the] opportunity for citizen involvement in democratic
processes").
83 City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 643 (1973)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting Pa. Dairies, Inc. v. Milk Control Comm'n, 318
U.S. 261, 275 (1943)). In contrast, if Congress is unhappy with a court's finding that
state law may stand, it can enact new legislation because "'the national government,
which has the ultimate power, remains free to remove the burden."' Id. at 643
(quoting Pa. Dairies,Inc., 318 U.S. at 275).
84 See generally DuVivier, supra note 53 (describing Attorney General Ashcroft's
efforts to use the federal Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-971 (2000),
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Many innovations arise at the state level in a manner "akin to
natural selection. 85
State legislators are forced into
experimentation by necessity because they are faced with
difficult issues, and "the spirit of state experimentation is one of
creative response to immediate necessity, often addressed to
solving a real problem staring the official in the face." 86
Some scholars credit state governments with innovations in
welfare reform, social security, unemployment compensation,
minimum-wage laws, public financing of political campaigns, nofault insurance, hospital cost containment, and prohibitions
against discrimination in housing and employment.87 Others also
say state experiments at the local level led the way in public
education, health care, taxation, penology, and environmental
protection. 88 One scholar surmised that "[c]ommon intuition
suggests that the vast majority of techniques used today to
govern were developed at the state and local level."8 9
Yet, critics have argued that states are not effective
laboratories for experimentation because state legislators are
risk averse. Legislators do not want to commit resources to an
experiment that may prove unpopular or costly.90
State
legislators, instead, have an incentive to support the status quo
and "free ride on the activities of other governments. ' '91
to preempt Oregon's Death with Dignity Act, described in this Article at notes 31923 and accompanying text).
85 Deborah J. Merritt, Federalism as Empowerment, 47 FLA. L. REV. 541, 551
(1995); see also Richard Briffault, Home Rule and Local PoliticalInnovation, 22 J.L.
& POL. 1, 31 (2006) ("Well, if the fifty states are laboratories for public policy
formation, then surely the 3,000 counties and 15,000 municipalities provide
logarithmically more opportunities for innovation .....
86 Friedman, supra note 13, at 398.
87 See Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy:
Federalismfor a Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 3-10 (1988) (identifying four
advantages of federalism: checks on the central government, greater accessibility,
diversity, and enhanced opportunities for experimentation); Michael W.
McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders' Design, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1484,
1491-1511 (1987) (book review) (arguing that federalism secures the public good,
protects private rights, and preserves the spirit and form of popular governments).
88 See DAVID L. SHAPIRO, FEDERALISM: A DIALOGUE 87-88 (1995).
89 Friedman, supra note 13, at 399.
90 See Susan Rose-Ackerman, Risk Taking and Reelection: Does Federalism
Promote Innovation?,9 J. LEGAL STUD. 593, 594 (1980) ("[L]ow-level governments

remain flawed mechanisms to rely on in the search for new ideas.").
91 Id. ("[S]ecure incumbents are likely to behave as if they were 'risk averse' even
if their underlying preferences are risk neutral. In a multiple government system
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Most local legislators especially prefer to avoid confronting
matters of social experimentation. The pressure-point structure

of traditional legislation permits a few vested representatives to
kill controversial bills, allowing other legislators to avoid taking
a stand.92
2. The History of Initiatives for Innovation
While federal and state legislators have an incentive to be
fiscally and issue conservative to guarantee reelection, citizen

voters do not have these concerns. Citizen voters, who are not
motivated by a desire to be reelected, are more likely to "vote
their conscience., 93
Furthermore, citizen votes on many
experimental measures are more likely to be well considered and
less likely to be influenced by outside sources when these
measures have the potential to impact voters or their immediate
acquaintances locally.9 4 Because these local voters are less

the overall incentive to take risks is reduced if the politician hopes to free ride on
the activities of other governments.").
92 SCHMIDT, supra note 5, at 33-34. Schmidt notes:
There are several ways to kill a bill that allow legislators to avoid answering
to the electorate-politicians are very creative in this regard. The New
Jersey state senate in 1981 and 1983 passed bills nearly unanimously to
amend the state constitution to provide for a statewide Initiative process.
Many of the legislators actually opposed Initiative, but voted for it because
they knew that it would be blocked in an assembly committee. This
arrangement allowed the senators to report to constituents that they had
voted for Initiative, and allowed the assembly members-with the
exception of the handful who voted to block I&R in committee-to report
to constituents that they too favored I&R, but did not get a chance to vote
on it.
Id.; see, e.g., Erik Bailey, Action on "Right to Die" Languishes in California,L.A.
TIMES, June 27, 1997, at A12 ("But from a political standpoint, as we saw with
Proposition 161, [PAD is] a difficult issue to address." (quoting Assemblyman Bob
Hertzberg)).
93 See INITIATIVE & REFERENDUM INST., GENERAL ELECTION POST ELECTION

REPORT 1 (2002), http://www.iandrinstitute.org/New%201RI%20Website%20Info/

Drop %20Down%20Boxes/Election%2OReports/2002 %20General%20Election/200
2%20POST-election %20Report%20-%2012-11-02%20-%20State%20by%20State
.pdf.
94 DuVivier, supra note 53, at 248 (arguing that initiatives having the following
qualities are the best candidates for initiative resolution: "Such initiatives represent
an alignment of factors: (a) topic areas that have traditionally been regulated by
the states, such as health and safety; (b) good candidates for experimentation at the
state level when there is no need for national uniformity; and (c) matters that
expand the rights of individuals without infringing on the rights of others.").
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influenced by the pressure points that snag controversial issues

in the traditional legislative process, fast-food government by
initiative has often been the first, if not the only, way that
innovative concepts find their way into law.
Historically, many significant innovations have been achieved
through, or with the help of, the initiative. In contrast to elected
legislators who fear repercussions, citizens have traditionally

embraced the initiative mechanism for experimentation on
important social issues, especially social issues that are
particularly controversial and can have a difficult time
surmounting the legislative process. 95 The Progressives sought
to address the "intransigence" and "lack of integrity of elected

legislators" through "public participation in the lawmaking
process," and their expectations were largely vindicated. A few
of the areas in which initiatives have been most beneficial are
reform of government itself, social reforms, civil rights, and
protection of the environment.
Reform of Government:

More initiatives have addressed

government reform than any other single category. 97 This is an
especially appropriate area for citizen participation because
legislators who benefit from the status quo are reluctant to
legislate change. 99 Many of the early reforms proposed by the
Progressives related to government reform, and early initiatives
succeeded in establishing (1) nominations of candidates through

95 Judith F. Daar, Direct Democracy and Bioethical Choices: Voting Life and
Death at the Ballot Box, 28 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 799, 830 (arguing voter-made
lawmaking is inherently more beneficial to reform than representative lawmaking).
96 JudicialApproaches to Direct Democracy, supra note 53, at 2763.
97 See, e.g., SCHMIDT, supra note 5, at 21; see also JudicialApproaches to Direct
Democracy, supra note 53, at 2764 ("Of all the initiatives placed on statewide
ballots in the last half of the twentieth century, nearly one in four addressed the
administration of government, whether in the legislative branch, in state agencies
and administrations, in the electoral or apportionment processes, or in the very
processes of direct democracy.").
98 "Just as scholars have advocated an enhanced judicial role when 'the ins are
choking off the channels of political change to ensure that they will stay in and the
outs will stay out,' so too can direct democracy promote more responsive and
representative government .... " JudicialApproaches to Direct Democracy, supra

note 53, at 2765 (quoting JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 103

(1980)). So too can direct democracy promote more responsive and representative
government in such situations. Id.
99 See Baker, supra note 8, at 320-21; Clark, supra note 8, at 347.
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primary elections,'0° (2) presidential primaries, °' (3) direct
election of U.S. senators, °2 and (4) home rule of cities. 103 Fair
reapportionment has often been a topic for initiatives, and
Arizona citizens blazed the way by passing a measure in 1912
requiring a population-based formula more than "half a century
before the U.S. Supreme Court ruled this method of
Well-meaning, if sometimes
reapportionment mandatory."' 0
problematic, initiative efforts to clean up government more
recently have included (1) term limits, 10 5 (2) campaign finance
reform,' ° and (3) limits on lobbying contributions.' 7
Social reforms: Early initiatives promoted several social
reforms long before the New Deal, including (1) the eight-hour
work day, 0 8 (2) a ban on child labor," 9 and (3) government aid
programs for farmers, the poor, the disabled, and the elderly. °
The 2006 elections continued to illustrate the initiative's
advantage in this category as six states passed initiative measures
increasing the minimum wage for hourly workers."'
Civil Rights: Women's suffrage was a key cause for the
Progressives. Successful initiatives in Arizona and Oregon
"helped prepare the way for passage of the national suffrage
amendment nine years later. ' ' 11 2 Early initiatives also (1) banned
poll
' 3 and (2) established a juvenile court system. 114 At
has speculated that the issue of slavery could
least taxes
one author

100 SCHMIDT, supra note 5, at 15 (Arkansas, Maine, Montana, Oregon, and South
Dakota).
101 Id. (Montana and Oregon).
102 Id. (Oregon, Montana, and Oklahoma).
103 Id. (Colorado and Oregon).
104

Id.

105 See WATERS, supra note 64, at 6.

106 See id.
107 See DuVivier, supra note 64, at 1050 (discussing Colorado Amendment 41
attempting to achieve high ethical standards and transparency in government).
108 SCHMIDT, supra note 5, at 18 (Colorado).

109 Id. (Arkansas).
110 Id. at 19.
Ill Election Results 2006, supra note 64, at 1; see also DuVivier, supra note 64, at
1050 n.27.
112 SCHMIDT, supra note 5, at 19.
113 Id. (California, Oregon, and Washington).
114 Id. (Colorado).
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have been resolved, and the Civil War averted, if the Senate had
passed a proposal to put the matter to a vote of the people."15
Environment: Initiatives also have played a vital role in

helping citizens take stands against business interests to protect
Oregon sponsored the first successful
the environment.
conservation initiative in 1910, banning the use of destructive
fish-harvesting techniques.1 6 Since that time, initiatives have
(1) establishing fish and game
addressed topics such as:
19 and
commissions, 117 (2) coastal protection,"" (3) animal rights,'
12

(4) the use of renewable energy by utility companies.

0

115 See TALLIAN, supra note 25, at 7. On January 3, 1861, Senator Crittenden
proposed "'taking the sense of the people and submitting to their vote ... [the]
Constitutional amendments to solve the slavery question by compromise."' Id.
(quoting CHARLES SUMNER LOBRINGIER, THE PEOPLE'S LAW 299 (1909)).
Senator Crittenden's proposal was defeated in the Senate by one vote, and the Civil
War began one month later. Id. Another author has suggested that:
Had the United States had a national Initiative process in the late 1960s
and early 1970s, the course of the Vietnam War and protests against it
might have been different. The Initiative process is effective not only in
venting popular discontent, but in channeling it constructively to make the
necessary changes.
SCHMIDT, supra note 5, at 29.
116 SCHMIDT, supra note 5, at 20.
117 Id. (during the 1930s and 1940s in Arkansas, Idaho, Montana, and
Washington).
118 See, e.g., Proposition 0: Citizens Oversight Advisory Committee (COAC),
http://www.lapropo.org/sitefiles/coac.htm (last visited July 30, 2007). California
Proposition 0 passed in 2006 and provides:
$500 million in bond measure funds to clean up the City's rivers, lakes,
beaches, and ocean. The language of Proposition 0 includes provisions for
the establishment of a Citizens Oversight Advisory Committee (COAC)
that is [to] be responsible for monitoring the bond program, projects,
budgets and schedules and to advise and report to the Mayor and the Los
Angeles City Council on its status.
Id.
119 For example, in 2006 Arizona Proposition 204 provided for a minimum living
space for pregnant pigs and calves. JAN BREWER, ARIZ. SEC'Y OF STATE, 2006
BALLOT PROPOSITION GUIDE 134 (2006), available at http://www.azsos.gov/
election/2006/Info/PubPamphlet/english/Prop204.pdf#page=21.
120 See, e.g., BALLOT INITIATIVE STRATEGY CTR., 2004 ELECTION RESULTS:
BALLOT INITIATIVE & REFERENDUM 18-19, 23 (2004), available at
http://www.ballot.org/verticalUSites/(26C6ABED-7A22-4B17-A84ACB72F7D15E3F}/uploads/182C8AB19-CA41-4A88-A59E-41DCC6C29D4B}.pdf
(noting the passage of Colorado Amendment No. 37 that would require public
utilities to derive ten percent of their electricity from alternative resources).
One of the primary goals of Ed Koupal's groups, the People's Lobby and the
Western Bloc, which resurrected the initiative process in the late 1960s, was a
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This list illustrates that the citizen initiative has been a
particularly effective tool in the arsenal for effecting change. In
fact, the reputation for innovative lawmaking at the state level is
perhaps more attributable
•• •
121to initiative-made law than to any
actions by state legislators.
Because they do not have to pass
through the pressure points of the traditional legislative process,

the fast-food quality of citizen initiatives makes them distinct
from legislative enactments and especially effective for reform.
3. Initiativesfor Moral Issues
Morality has long been a driving force in the initiative

movement. Prohibitionists joined forces with those who lobbied
for the initiative power hoping the direct vote would help them
legislate against the use of alcohol. 122
Yet every early

proposition in California that attempted to prohibit alcohol or
regulate liquor failed, 123 and the Eighteenth Amendment was
ratified by state legislatures, not by the people.124 Other moral

issues have been the focus of initiatives, often showing back-andforth swings between competing majorities such as prohibiting or
legalizing fights 125 and gambling. 2 6 Some of the most recent
nationwide attempt to use initiatives to freeze the advance of nuclear power. See
TALLIAN, supra note 25, at 113-14. Most of the nuclear freeze initiatives failed to
pass, but the initiative attention to the issue was effective: 1979 was the last year a
new nuclear plant was approved in the United States. See, e.g., Michael V.
Copeland, Diggingthe Nuclear Future, BUSINESS 2.0, Aug. 2007, at 84, 85.
121 Cf. supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text.
122 GOEBEL, supra note 45, at 77-79 (noting that "the prohibition movement"
joined organized labor and "the single taxers" as "another key ally of direct
democracy advocates").
123 See, e.g., TALLIAN, supra note 25, at 173, 176-78 (noting the failures of
California Propositions 2 (1914), 1(1916), and 1 & 22 (1918)).
124 U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII (repealed 1933). In contrast, Amendment XXI
repealing Prohibition is the only Constitutional amendment ratified by
constitutional conventions of the people instead of by state legislatures. See DAVID
E. KYvIG, REPEALING NATIONAL PROHIBITION 162 (1979).
125 Compare California Prop. 20 (1914), SEC'Y OF STATE, AMENDMENTS TO THE
CONSTITUTION

AND

PROPOSED

STATUTES

95

(1914),

available

at

http://library.uchastings.eduballot-pdfl1914g.pdf (prohibiting prize fighting and
boxing), with California Prop. 7 (1924), FRANK C. JORDAN, SEC'Y OF STATE,
AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION AND PROPOSED STATUTES 9 (1924),
available at http://library.uchastings.edu/ballot-pdf/1924g.pdf (legalizing boxing and
wrestling contests for prizes).
126 See, e.g., BILL JONES, SEC'Y OF STATE, CALIFORNIA VOTER INFORMATION

GUIDE 20 (1998), available at http://library.uchastings.edu/ballot-pdfl1998g.pdf
(discussing California Prop. 5 allowing federally recognized Indian tribes to operate
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moral battles being fought by initiative are the legalization of

medical marijuana,

127

gay rights,

128

abortion rights,

129

and stem

cell research. 3 °
Failure to resolve these moral issues is especially troubling
when efforts to expand the rights of individuals to make their
own moral decisions are thwarted by an influential minority

simply on the basis that the exercise of this right offends the
beliefs or sensibilities of the minority group. Although some of
the other moral dilemmas currently subject to initiative battles
arguably infringe the rights of one group or another, the right
to request medical assistance in hastening one's death is the
quintessential example of a right to self-determination.
This Article focuses on the advantages of the initiative process
in federalism rather than on the substance of initiative issues that
are the best candidates for allowing citizens to determine "what

high stakes casinos and establish additional casinos without state legislature
approval); Press Release, Sam Reed, Wash. Sec'y of State, Initiative 892 Qualifies
for 2004 General Ballot (Aug. 3, 2004), http://www.secstate.wa.gov/office/
osos news.aspx?i=jeDvwiNAVQX7HqlwWP1%2FRg%3D%3D (discussing
Washington Initiative 824, an effort to legalize slot machines).
127 DuVivier, supra note 53, at 222-24.
128 For example, Colorado Amendment 2 (1992), Arkansas Amendment 3 (2004),
Georgia Amendment 1 (2004), Kentucky Amendment 1 (2004), Michigan Proposal
04-2 (2004), Mississippi Amendment 1 (2004), Montana Initiative 96 (2004), North
Dakota Measure 1 (2004), Ohio Issue 1 (2004), Oklahoma Question 711 (2004),
Oregon Measure 36 (2004), and Utah Amendment 3 (2004) all prohibited same-sex
marriages.
See Election 2004-Ballot Measures, CNN.COM, Nov. 3, 2004,
http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2004/pages/results/ballot.measures/.
129 CHRIS NELSON,

S.D. SEC'Y OF STATE, SOUTH DAKOTA 2006 BALLOT

12 (2006), available at http://www.sdsos.gov/electionsvoteregistration/
electvoterpdfs/2006southdakotaballotquestionpamphlet.pdf
(describing Referred
Law 6).
QUESTIONS

130 See, e.g., CAL. ATTORNEY GEN., PROPOSITION 71:

SUMMARY

68

(2004),

OFFICIAL TITLE AND

available at http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/bpnov04/

prop-71_entire.pdf; ROBYN CARNAHAN, MO. SEC'Y OF STATE, 2006 BALLOT
MEASURE:
CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT 2 (2006), http://www.sos.mo.gov/

elections/2006petitions/ppStemCell.asp; see also Michael S. Mireles, Jr., States as
Innovation System Laboratories: California, Patents, and Stem Cell Technology, 28
CARDOZO L. REV 1133, 1193-1207 (2006) (discussing California as a laboratory for
stem cell technology).
131 For example, a woman's right to choose to control her own body by having an
abortion under some religious theories interferes with the unborn child's right to be
brought to full term. Also, the right to use medical marijuana to relieve pain may
impact the right of others to live in a society free from the negative impacts of the
criminal use of the drug.
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serves the public interest. ' ' 132 However, the physician-assisted

death issue represents an alignment of the three factors for
133
controversial issues that might best be resolved by initiative.
The first factor is a straightforward and logical topic.

PAD

concerns health and safety, topic areas that have traditionally
been regulated by the states. In addition, every individual must
face death, so the matter is not only a local one; it is deeply
personal. Finally, the topic is not overly complex, and most
voters understand it and will consider its consequences carefully
as it could potentially affect each one of them. The second
factor is no infringement on minority rights. PAD expands the
rights of individuals who choose to exercise the right and does
not impact the rights of others to hold whatever religious beliefs
they wish. 134 The third factor is no need for rrationaluniformity.
The Supreme Court itself has stated that there is no need for
uniformity and that PAD 1is35 a good candidate for
experimentation at the state level.
Arguably, legislatures should be the better forums for
resolving the PAD moral battle. The legislative process is
tailored to sculpt compromises respecting both majority and
minority views. Unfortunately, however, legislatures have been
132 City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enters., 426 U.S. 668, 678 (1976) (noting that it
is appropriate for voters to use 'their traditional right through direct legislation to
override the views of their elected representatives as to what serves the public
interest"' (quoting S. Alameda Spanish Speaking Org. v. City of Union City, 424
F.2d 291, 294 (9th Cir. 1970))). Yet in the PAD debate, the people are not
overriding their representatives' views; instead they are trying to get action when
the representatives have failed to express a view. The Eastlake Court noted that
when the people exercised their direct vote, they were exercising "a power reserved
by the people to themselves." Id. at 675.
133 DuVivier, supra note 53, at 248. Some of the justifications for eliminating
"criminal penalties for consensual sexual relations" of homosexuals might be
comparable in the PAD context: assisted suicide statutes (1) penalize conduct
many doctors engage in; (2) regulate conduct not harmful to others; and (3) are
arbitrarily enforced. Cf Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572 (2003); see also Diana
Hassel, Sex and Death: Lawrence's Liberty and Physician-AssistedSuicide, 9 U. PA.
J. CONST. L. 1003, 1046-48 (2007).
134 Some opponents argue that legalizing PAD may hurt society by giving doctors
the power to make life and death decisions. Yet, doctors already have this power
because the Supreme Court has declared that individuals have a constitutional right
to refuse medical treatment. See Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Heath, 497 U.S. 261,
265-69 (1990). This right to make a life or death decision for an incompetent
patient gives doctors more power than they would exercise by simply writing a
prescription for a mentally competent patient who is contemplating death.
135 See, e.g., Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243,287-91 (2006).

OREGON LAW REVIEW

especially

inept

at

addressing

this

[Vol. 86,895

controversial

issue.

Legislators' own deeply held personal beliefs that may conflict

with the majority of their constituents or fear of igniting the ire
of minority interests who hold such fervent beliefs has mired this
topic in the pressure points and stalled all legislation on the

issue.
II
FEDERALISM IN THE PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED DEATH DEBATE

Freshly minted doctors cannot leave medical school without

first taking the Hippocratic Oath, which binds them to prescribe
regimens for the good of their patients according to their ability
and judgment and to never do harm to anyone. 36 While the
136 See ROBERT M. VEATCH, MEDICAL ETHICS 7 (2d ed. 1997).
"The
Hippocratic Oath is often acknowledged by both physicians and lay people to be
the foundation of medical ethics for physicians .... " Id. at 6. The oath emerged in
the fifth century B.C. and is "traced to a group of physicians in ancient Greece...
[headed by] Hippocrates, but surely not all the writings were.., authored by him."
Id. Although there are many translations and modified modern version, here is one
translation of the original Greek:
I swear by Apollo the physician, and Asclepius, and Hygieia and
Panacea and all the gods and goddesses as my witnesses, that, according to
my ability and judgement, I will keep this Oath and this contract:
To hold him who taught me this art equally dear to me as my parents, to
be a partner in life with him, and to fulfill his needs when required; to look
upon his offspring as equals to my own siblings, and to teach them this art,
if they shall wish to learn it, without fee or contract; and that by the set
rules, lectures, and every other mode of instruction, I will impart a
knowledge of the art to my own sons, and those of my teachers, and to
students bound by this contract and having sworn this Oath to the law of
medicine, but to no others.
I will use those dietary regimens which will benefit my patients
according to my greatest ability and judgement, and I will do no harm or
injustice to them.
I will not give a lethal drug to anyone if I am asked, nor will I advise
such a plan; and similarly I will not give a woman a pessary to cause an
abortion.
In purity and according to divine law will I carry out my life and my art.
I will not use the knife, even upon those suffering from stones, but I will
leave this to those who are trained in this craft.
Into whatever homes I go, I will enter them for the benefit of the sick,
avoiding any voluntary act of impropriety or corruption, including the
seduction of women or men, whether they are free men or slaves.
Whatever I see or hear in the lives of my patients, whether in
connection with my professional practice or not, which ought not to be
spoken of outside, I will keep secret, as considering all such things to be
private.
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obligation to do both good and no harm to patients may have
seemed consistent in the past, modern medicine has created a
tension about when and 37how to stop in the case of seriously ill
people who want to die.
In 2003, over 35.9 million Americans were age sixty-five or

older. 38 Experts project that this number will almost double by
2030.139 A major reason for this rapid growth is the miracle of
modern medicine. Life expectancy in 1900 was 47.3 years.' 40 In
contrast, the average American in 2000 could expect to live until
the ripe age of 76.9.141
Unfortunately, the same medical advances that have helped
extend life sometimes also extend death, creating a "twilight
zone of suspended animation' 142 that draws out the hardship for
So long as I maintain this Oath faithfully and without corruption, may it
be granted to me to partake of life fully and the practice of my art, gaining
the respect of all men for all time. However, should I transgress this Oath
and violate it, may the opposite be my fate.
U.S. NAT'L LIBRARY OF MED., NAT'L INSTS. OF HEALTH, GREEK MEDICINE: THE
HIPPOCRATIC OATH, http://www.nlm.nih.gov/hmd/greek/greekoath.html
(last

visited Apr. 8, 2008).
137 "There is a tragic mismatch between the health care many seriously ill people
want and what they get ....We don't know when or how to stop." Leon Jaroff,
Knowing When to Stop, TIME, Dec. 4, 1995, at 76, 76 (quoting Dr. Knaus, author of
a study on hospital death). The definition of "harm" may include mental as well as
physical damage. See, e.g., MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY
(11th ed. 2005). Consequently, a doctor should not ignore the mental damage
created by attending only to a patient's physical needs. A family practice doctor in
Ohio noted that he attended a public education seminar on pain management and
was "shocked that more than 30 percent of the patients in the audience raised their
hands when asked if they had Kevorkian's telephone number [to help them die]....
Dying patients want dignity, they want to be in control and they don't want a tube
in every orifice." Joyce Peterson & Karen Klinka, Suicide Requests Rare, State
Doctors Say Focus on Care, Experts Urge, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, June 21, 1997, at 8.
138 WAN HE ET AL., U.S. DEP'T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 65+ IN THE UNITED
STATES: 2005, at 1 (2005), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2006pubs/p23209.pdf.
139 Id.

Id.
Id.; see also CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE WORLD FACTBOOK:
UNITED STATES, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/
us.html (last visited Apr. 11, 2008) (stating life expectancy overall in 2008 is 78, with
an expectancy of 75.15 for males and 80.97 for females).
142 Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 270 (1990) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) ("Medical technology has effectively created a twilight zone of
suspended animation where death commences while life, in some form,
continues.").
140
141
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families and the pain for the soon-to-be deceased. These
twilight-zone patients "simply didn't exist a generation ago
because the technology and drugs that help keep them alive
didn't exist.', 143 Doctors now recognize that some efforts to keep
a person alive may be doing that patient more harm than
good. 4

An overwhelming majority of Americans believe that an
145
individual patient should have the right to refuse life support.
In addition, the U.S. Supreme Court has declared that this right
to refuse medical treatment was a fundamental liberty interest
protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment.
Despite this, many state legislatures have had
difficulty passing "living will" legislation recognizing this right
because of opposition by groups that morally oppose the right on
religious grounds.
Polls also suggest that, even though efforts to identify a
federal constitutional right to die failed,47 a majority of
Americans favor physician-assisted death. 148 This support has
been a growing trend since 1947 when only thirty-seven percent
143 See David Noonan, Special Careat the End of Life, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 16,2006,
at 67, 67.
144 See, e.g., HARRIS INTERACTIVE, HARRIS POLL #32, MAJORITIES OF U.S.
ADULTS FAVOR EUTHANASIA AND PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED SUICIDE BY MORE

THAN TWO-TO-ONE (2005), http://www.harrisinteractive.com/harris-poll/index.asp

?PID=561 (reporting the results 2005 phone survey finding that more than twothirds of adults would like euthanasia for dying patients when requested by that
patient, and two-thirds would like their state to adopt an Oregon-style Death with
Dignity Act). But see Polls Show Once Public Understands the Issue: DoctorAssisted Suicide Fails, U.S. NEWSWIRE, Mar. 14, 2006 [hereinafter Polls Show]
(discussing polls to the contrary). An August 2005 Pew Research poll found only
forty-four percent of people "[f]avor making it legal for doctors to Assist in
suicide." Id.("Nationwide sample of 1,502 adults, 18 years of age or older."). A
May 2005 Gallup poll found forty-nine percent found doctor-assisted suicide
"acceptable" and forty-two percent found it "wrong." Id. ("Telephone interviews
with 1,005 national adults, aged 18 and older.").
145 For example, a 2005 poll by the Pew Research Center showed that eighty-four
percent of those polled agreed that "patients [should have] the right to decide
whether they want to be kept alive through medical treatment," while ten percent
disagreed. PEW RESEARCH CTR., STRONG PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR RIGHT TO DIE 2

(2006), availableat http://people-press.org/reports/pdf/266.pdf.
146 See infra notes 174-79 and accompanying text (discussing the Cruzan case).
147 See infra notes 192-225 and accompanying text (discussing the Quill and
Glucksberg cases).
148 Bill Theobald, Poll Finds Support for Assisted Dying, STATESMAN J., Oct. 17,
2005, at B1.

2007]

Fast-FoodGovernment and Physician-AssistedDeath

polled supported PAD. 149 In comparison, a Gallup poll in 1996
showed that seventy-five percent of Americans favored PAD. 50

In addition, eight separate polls by Field Research since 1979
show a majority of Californians, ranging from sixty-four to
seventy-five percent, consistently support PAD.' 5 '
Physicians, however, disagree about PAD. But, it does have

significant support within the medical community. For example,
physicians have given high approval ratings to its use under
Oregon's PAD statute, 52 and several polls showed a majority of
doctors favored PAD in certain circumstances.153 Moreover, the

California Association of Physician Groups, the nation's largest
professional organization representing physicians practicing in
the managed care model, recently voted to support PAD
legislation in California. 54 And although the American Medical
Association and some state medical associations have opposed

149 Franklin G. Miller & John C. Fletcher, Physician-Assisted Suicide and Active
Euthanasia,in PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED DEATH 75, 78 (James M. Humber et al. eds.,
1994).
150 Katherine C. Glynn, Note, Turning to State Legislatures to Legalize PhysicianAssisted Suicide for Seriously I11,Non-Terminal Patients After Vacco v. Quill and
Washington v. Glucksberg, 6 J.L. & POL'Y 329, 351 n.129 (1997) (citing Jeff Hooten,
A Slippery Slope to the Real Dr. Death, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 17, 1996, at B7).
151 See Valerie J. Vollmar, Recent Developments in Physician-Assisted Suicide
(Feb. 2006), http://www.willamette.edu/wucl/pdf/pas/2006-02.pdf. In a Field poll in
March of 2006, seventy percent supported a right for terminally ill patients to
receive prescriptions for life-ending medication. Id. The percentage in favor
dropped to sixty-two percent when the question asked if a doctor could administer
the drugs. Id.
152 E.g., Theobald, supra note 148.
153 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 748 n.12 (1997) (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (citing sources saying sixty percent of doctors in Oregon support PAD
and fifty-six percent of doctors preferred legalizing assisted suicide to an explicit
ban); Jonathan S. Cohen et al., Attitudes Toward Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia
Among Physicians in Washington State, 331 NEw ENG. J. MED. 89, 89 (1994)
(noting fifty-three percent of physicians surveyed said it should be legal for doctors
to perform PAD, but only forty percent said they were willing to do so); see also
JOAN M. KRAUSKOPF ET AL., 1 ELDERLAw:

ADVOCACY FOR THE AGING §§

13.11-13.27, at 488-502 (2d ed. 1993).
154 Vollmar, May 2007 Developments, supra note 10; see also About CAPG,
http://www.capg.org/home/index.asp?page=7 (last visited July 19, 2007) (noting
more than fifty percent of California healthcare is provided by members of the
California Association of Physician Groups or CAPG). The legislation, AB 374,
did not pass. See Nancy Vogel, Assisted Death Bill Fails Again in Capitol, L.A.
TIMES, June 8, 2007, at B1 (noting the bill's authors, knowing that they did not have
the support to pass the legislation, failed to bring it for a vote).
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legalizing PAD, 5 5 these same organizations "unequivocally

endorse[] the practice of terminal sedation-the administration
of sufficient dosages of pain-killing medication to terminally ill

patients to protect them from excruciating pain even when it is
clear that the time of death will be advanced.' 156 The AMA also
supports legislation permitting "palliative care,' 57 or care
allowing a 58physician to prescribe pain relief instead of curative

treatment.

Physician support for terminal sedation and palliative care
illustrates a troubling gray area in the entire PAD debate. The

distinction between "permitting death to ensue from an
underlying fatal disease and causing it to

occur by the

155 Bryan Hilliard, The Politics of Palliative Care and the Ethical Boundaries of
Medicine: Gonzales v. Oregon as a Cautionary Tale, 35 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 158,
170 (2007) ("[S]ome professional medical organizations, most notably the American
Medical Association, do indeed oppose making physician-assisted suicide legal.");
see also Ralph Jimenez, Legislators Debate Assisted-Suicide Bill: New Hampshire,
BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 7, 1993, at 37 (noting the New Hampshire Medical Society

opposed a bill repealing New Hampshire's ban on assisted suicide). The California
Medical Association opposed California Proposition 161 in 1992 and subsequent
legislative efforts to legalize PAD. Bailey, supra note 92; Mark Gladstone, AssistedSuicide Debate Shifts to State, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 20, 1999, at A3.
156 Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 751 (Stevens, J., concurring).
157 See, e.g., Am. Med. Ass'n, H-85.958 Palliative Care and End of Life Care,
http://www.ama-assn.org/apps/pf-new/pfonline?fn=resultLink&doc=policyfiles/
HnE/H-85.958.HTM&s-t=palliative+care&catg=AMA/HnE&catg=AMA/BnGnC
&catg=AMA/DIR&&nth=l&&st-p=0&nth=2& (last visited Aug. 4, 2007). The
AMA states:
Our AMA: 1. Recognizes the importance of providing interdisciplinary
palliative care for patients with disabling chronic or life-limiting illness to
prevent and relieve suffering and to support the best possible quality of life
for these patients and their families. 2. Encourages research in the field of
palliative medicine to improve treatment of unpleasant symptoms that
affect quality of life for patients with advanced, chronic illness.
3. Encourages physicians to be knowledgeable of patient eligibility criteria
for hospice benefits and, realizing that prognostication is inexact, to make
referrals based on their best clinical judgment.
Id.
158 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-3-104(4) (West 2006). The statute
provides:
"Palliative care" means medical care and treatment provided by a licensed
medical caregiver to a patient with an advanced chronic or terminal illness
whose condition may not be responsive to curative treatment and who is,
therefore, receiving treatment that relieves pain and suffering and supports
the best possible quality of his or her life.
Id. §§ 18-3-104(4)(b)(ItI), (4)(c) ("Paragraph (a) of this subsection (4) shall not be
interpreted to permit a medical caregiver to assist in the suicide of the patient.").
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administration of medication or other means"' 59 is not always
clear. Sometimes it can rest solely on the prescribing doctor's
intent. Yet, if the doctor is simply striving to "ease the patient's

suffering and to comply with [the patient's] wishes ... [then the]
same intent and causation may exist."' 60 In fact, thirty-one
percent of doctors in one survey 6 and twenty-three percent in
another admitted they already had performed some form of
PAD. 62 Furthermore, no medical associations have supported
criminalization of PAD, and some have stated they were
"concerned about legislating what should go on between doctors
' 63
and patients.'
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 750 (Stevens, J., concurring).
Id. at 751; see also Peterson & Klinka, supra note 137 (quoting one doctor as
saying, "But there are times when I feel like the morphine fairy because the only
thing I can do for a terminally ill patient is maybe increase the dosage to make them
comfortable," and reporting another saying he "never believed the pain-relieving
medications he gives [his patients] cause death, even though he has had patients die
within minutes of receiving painkillers. Admittedly, it's a fine line.... But, 'I've
never had the feeling I've pushed someone over the line."').
161 Glynn, supra note 150, at 334 n.28 ("In 1988, the Center for Health Ethics and
Policy at the University of Colorado conducted a similar survey of all licensed
doctors in Colorado. Thirty-one percent of the 7,095 doctors surveyed responded,
37% of whom admitted to giving life-shortening medication to patients." (citing
Diane E. Meir, Doctor's Attitudes and Experiences with Physician-Assisted Death:
A Review of the Literature,in PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED DEATH, supra note 149, at 1,
14)); see also Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 749 n.12 (Stevens, J., concurring) (noting
eighteen percent of Michigan oncologists reported "active participation in assisted
suicide," twenty-four percent of physicians who treat AIDS patients responded they
would "likely grant a patient's request for assistance in hastening death," and
several doctors in Washington State said they had complied with their patients'
requests to hasten death).
162 Glynn, supra note 150, at 334 n.28 ("The survey was conducted in 1987 by the
National Hemlock Society. 5,000 California physicians that were members of the
American Medical Association were surveyed anonymously by mail. Only 12% of
the physicians surveyed responded." (citations omitted)). Eighty-one percent of
those physicians who did perform PAD in the second survey confessed to doing it
more than once. Id. at 334; see also Diane Martindale, A Culture of Death, SCI.
AM., May 23, 2005, http://www.sciam.com/article.cfm?id=a-culture-of-death.
163 Christopher Rowland, Should Death Be Hastened? Senate Bill Would Make
Doctor-Assisted Suicide a Felony, PROVIDENCE J.-BULL. (R.I.), May 24, 1996, at
1A (quoting Arthur Frazzano, president of the Rhode Island Medical Society,
testifying about why the group took a neutral position on a bill criminalizing PAD
in Rhode Island). Legislation that criminalizes PAD also could have a chilling
effect on the use of palliative care because "physicians must worry that law
enforcement officers will see a criminal intent where none existed."
David
Orentlicher & Arthur Caplan, The Pain Relief Promotion Act of 1999: A Serious
Threat to Palliative Care, 283 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 255, 256 (2000); see also infra
notes 277-82 and accompanying text.
159
160
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Despite this significant support for PAD, only one state in the
Union allows it, and that state legalized the practice through a
citizen initiative. 164
Similarly, Congress and some state
legislatures have made efforts to legalize PAD, but all of these
efforts also have failed. Instead, interest groups have been able
to take advantage of the traditional legislative process to
promote minority views on the topic. Consequently, only
Oregon's direct vote by initiative successfully reflected the will
of most citizens.
A. On the FederalSide of the Federalism Balance: A Federal
ConstitutionalRight to Choose Death
The first wave of the modern PAD debate began in the courts.
The U.S. Supreme Court recognized a fundamental right to
choose death by refusing medical treatment that prolonged
dying.1 65 By grounding the right in the Constitution, the Court
effectively ended further state debate on the issue.
Arguably, choosing death by refusing medical treatment that
prolongs dying is simply the reciprocal of a right to die by
requesting medical treatment to hasten dying. The Supreme
Court had the opportunity to recognize constitutional protection
for such a right to die. If the Court had done so, the debate over
PAD would have ended at the federal level; preemption would
prevent states from restricting a right that was constitutionally
protected. However, the Court tossed the debate from the
federal to the state realm when it refused to recognize a right to
die or to receive assistance in choosing death.
1. The Right to Refuse Medical Treatment
The courts first recognized a constitutional right to choose
death by refusing medical treatment in response to cases
involving medical treatment that extended patients' lives.
Although over a hundred cases addressed this right under
various common law and constitutional theories,166 the

See infra notes 301-20 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 166-79 and accompanying text.
166 See Hoefler, supra note 27, at 156-58 (listing theories including informed
consent under the common law, a federal Constitutional privacy right, and a
Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest).
164
165
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predominant framework for the debate
arose in two cases: In re
68
Quinlan167 and Cruzan v. Harmon.1

Ironically, in the late 1970s, a comatose patient awoke the
American public to the problems created by extending life
through modern medical technology. 69 At the age of twentyone, Karen Ann Quinlan lapsed into a persistent vegetative
state 17 after ingesting alcohol and drugs. 17 The hospital placed

Quinlan on a respirator and, despite the wishes of her family,
refused to take her off. Although the district court denied her

guardian's request for authority to remove the respirator, 72 the
Supreme Court of New Jersey held that removal of the
respirator to allow Quinlan to die naturally was a valuable

incident to Ms. Quinlan's right to privacy under the U.S. and
New Jersey constitutions
guardian. 73

and could be asserted

by her

In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976).
168 Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408 (Mo. 1988), affd sub nom., Cruzan v. Dir.,
Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
169 The Court stated:
167

The logical corollary of the doctrine of informed consent is that the
patient generally possesses the right not to consent, that is, to refuse
treatment. Until about 15 years ago and the seminal decision in [Quinlan],
the number of right-to-refuse-treatment decisions was relatively few. Most
of the earlier cases involved patients who refused medical treatment
forbidden by their religious beliefs, thus implicating First Amendment
rights as well as common-law rights of self-determination. More recently,
however, with the advance of medical technology capable of sustaining life
well past the point where natural forces would have brought certain death
in earlier times, cases involving the right to refuse life-sustaining treatment
have burgeoned.
Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 270 (footnotes omitted); see also FAY A. ROzOVSKY, CONSENT
TO TREATMENT § 7.1, at 415-23 (1984); Norman L. Cantor, A Patient's Decision to
Decline Life-Saving Medical Treatment: Bodily Integrity Versus the Preservationof
Life, 26 RUTGERS L. REV. 228, 229 n.5 (1973) (noting paucity of cases); Margeurite
Ann Chapman, The Uniform Rights of the Terminally Ill Act: Too Little, Too Late?,
42 ARK. L. REV. 319, 324 n.15 (1989). See generally Kristine Cordier Karnezis,
Annotation, Patient'sRight to Refuse Treatment Allegedly Necessary to Sustain Life,
93 A.L.R.3D 67 (1979) (collecting cases).
170 Defined as "generally, a condition in which a person exhibits motor reflexes
but evinces no indications of significant cognitive function." Cruzan, 497 U.S. at
266.
171 Norman L. Cantor, Twenty-Five Years After Quinlan:
A Review of the
Jurisprudenceof Death and Dying, 29 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 182, 183 (2001).
172 Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 653.
173 The Court stated:
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Not until the early 1990s, thirteen years after Quinlan, did the

U.S. Supreme Court speak to the same issue of a patient's right
to refuse life-sustaining treatment. A single car accident in rural
southwest Missouri landed Nancy Cruzan in the hospital in a
persistent vegetative state.1 74 Cruzan's family sought to have the

feeding tube providing her with artificial nutrition removed
when it became apparent that Cruzan had no chance of
regaining her mental faculties. 1 75 Although the district court
issued a declaratory judgment instructing the hospital to remove
the feeding tube, the Missouri Supreme Court reversed, finding
that Ms. Cruzan's right to refuse medical treatment did not
outweigh the state's policy favoring 176preservation
embodied in Missouri's living will statute.

of life

On certiorari, the U.S. Supreme Court, in a five-to-four
decision, affirmed. 77

Primarily, the Court affirmed a state's

Although the Constitution does not explicitly mention a right of privacy,
Supreme Court decisions have recognized that a right of personal privacy
exists and that certain areas of privacy are guaranteed under the
Constitution. The Court has interdicted judicial intrusion into many
aspects of personal decision, sometimes basing this restraint upon the
conception of a limitation of judicial interest and responsibility, such as
with regard to contraception and its relationship to family life and decision.
The Court in Griswold found the unwritten constitutional right of
privacy to exist in the penumbra of specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights
'formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and
substance.' Presumably this right is broad enough to encompass a patient's
decision to decline medical treatment under certain circumstances, in much
the same way as it is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision to
terminate pregnancy under certain conditions.
Nor is such right of privacy forgotten in the New Jersey Constitution.
Id. at 663 (citations omitted). Ironically, when Quinlan was weaned from the
respirator, she was able to breathe on her own and passed away ten years later in a
nursing home. See Lawrence K. Altman, Quinlan Case Is Revisited and Yields New
Finding,N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 1994, at A16.
174 Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 411 (Mo. 1998), affd sub nom., Cruzan v.
Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990). Note that many patients with brain
injuries transition from a coma to a vegetative state. Steven Laureys, Eyes Open,
Brain Shut, SCI. AM., May 2007, at 84, 84. If they remain in a vegetative state for
over a year, the "chances of [regaining consciousness] are close to zero." See id. at
86.
175 Cruzan, 760 S.W.2d at 411.
176

Id.

Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 265. After Quinlan, however, most courts have based a
right to refuse treatment either solely on the common law right to informed consent
or on both the common law right and a constitutional privacy right. See LAURENCE
H. TRIBE ET AL., AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1365 (2d ed. 1988).
177
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power to safeguard against potential abuses by requiring clear
and convincing evidence of an incompetent person's desire to
Significantly,
have life-sustaining treatment withdrawn. 78

however, the Court in Cruzan for the first time considered
alternative theories set forth in state cases addressing the right to
refuse medical treatment. Cruzan stands out because the Court
held that competent individuals have, under the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, "a constitutionally
interest in refusing unwanted medical
protected liberty
79
treatment.',
2. But No Right to Die
A conjunction of societal forces resulted in fevered activity on
the PAD issue in the five years immediately following the
Cruzan decision.' 80 In 1993, the Hemlock Society established the
178 See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 278-82. The Court stated:
Petitioners insist that under the general holdings of our cases, the forced
administration of life-sustaining medical treatment, and even of artificially
delivered food and water essential to life, would implicate a competent
person's liberty interest. Although we think the logic of the cases discussed
above would embrace such a liberty interest, the dramatic consequences
involved in refusal of such treatment would inform the inquiry as to
whether the deprivation of that interest is constitutionally permissible. But
for purposes of this case, we assume that the United States Constitution
would grant a competent person a constitutionally protected right to refuse
lifesaving hydration and nutrition.
Id. at 279. "But determining that a person has a 'liberty interest' under the Due
Process Clause does not end the inquiry; 'whether respondent's constitutional rights
have been violated must be determined by balancing his liberty interests against the
relevant state interests."' Id. (quoting Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 321
(1982)).
179 Id. at 278. The Court noted: "Although many state courts have held that a
right to refuse treatment is encompassed by a generalized constitutional right of
privacy, we have never so held. We believe this issue is more properly analyzed in
terms of a Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest." Id.
After Cruzan, Congress passed the Patient Self-Determination Act, 42 U.S.C. §
1395cc(f) (2006). This Act merely requires medical providers to make information
available to patients so they are aware of their right to refuse medical treatment. §
1395cc(f)(1)(A). Because the Supreme Court recognized this as a right protected
by the Constitution, Congress could not pass legislation determining whether the
right was appropriate or not. Similarly, states addressed the issue only by passing
legislation addressing procedures for exercising the federal constitutional right.
E.g., N.J. REV. STAT. ANN. § 26:2H-54 (2008).
180 Glynn, supra note 150, at 350-51. Arguably, the debate started beforehand
because the Euthanasia Society of America, the first American organization to
crusade for the legalization of euthanasia, was founded in 1938. Id.
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Patients' Rights Organization, a political action group to
Compassion in Dying, an
advocate the cause of PAD.8'
alternate PAD group, was founded in 1993, and in 1997, created
its national advocacy group, the Compassion in Dying
Federation, which participated in many of the pivotal cases on

the issue. 182 Scholars weighed in ,183s and opposing groups, such as
181 Compassion & Choices, Milestones in the Modern Choice in Dying
Movement, http://www.compassionandchoices.org/aboutus/themovement.php (last
visited Aug. 4, 2007). Note also in 1991, Derek Humphrey, founder of the Hemlock
Society, first published Final Exit: The Practicalitiesof Self-Deliverance for the
Terminally Ill. Id. In 2003, the Hemlock Society merged with Compassion in Dying
and changed its name to End of Life Choices. Id.
182 See id.; see also KRAUSKOPF ET AL., supra note 153, §§ 13.11-13.27, at 488502 (stating Compassion in Dying brought the Quill and Glucksberg cases).
183 See, e.g., JAMES M. HOEFLER WITH BRIAN E. KAMOIE, DEATHRIGHT (1994);
Michael P. Allen, The Constitution at the Threshold of Life and Death: A Suggested
Approach to Accommodate an Interest in Life and a Right to Die, 53 AM. U. L. REV.
971 (2004); Brian H. Bix, Physician-Assisted Suicide and Federalism, 17 NOTRE
DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 53 (2003); Cantor, supra note 169; Bette-Jane
Crigger, Dying Well? A Colloquy on Euthanasiaand Assisted Suicide, HASTINGS
CENTER REP., Mar.-Apr. 1992, at 6; Scott Gast, Who Defines "Legitimate Medical
Practice?" Lessons Learned from the Controlled Substances Act, Physician-Assisted
Suicide, & Oregon v. Ashcroft, 10 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 261 (2002); Neil M.
Gorsuch, The Right to Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia, 23 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 599 (2000); Thane Josef Messinger, A Gentle and Easy Death: From Ancient
Greece to Beyond Cruzan Toward A Reasoned Legal Response to the Societal
Dilemma of Euthanasia,71 DENV. U. L. REV. 175 (1993); Colin Miller, A Death by
Any Other Name: The Federal Government's Inconsistent Treatment of Drugs Used
in Lethal Injections and Physician-AssistedSuicide, 17 J.L. & HEALTH 217 (200203) [hereinafter Miller, A Death by Any Other Name]; Colin Miller, Escape from
New York: Analyzing the State's Relative Interests in Proscribingthe Withdrawalof
Life Support and Physician-Assisted Suicide, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 779
(2003) [hereinafter Miller, Escape from New York]; Jim Persels, Forcingthe Issue of
Physician-AssistedSuicide: Impact of the Kevorkian Case on the EuthanasiaDebate,
14 J. LEGAL MED. 93 (1993); Carol A. Pratt, Efforts to Legalize Physician-Assisted
Suicide in New York, Washington and Oregon: A Contrast Between Judicial and
Initiative Approaches-Who Should Decide?, 77 OR. L. REV. 1027 (1998); Christin
A. Batt, Comment, The Pain Relief Promotion Act of 1999 and Physician-Assisted
Suicide: A Call for CongressionalSelf-Restraint, 38 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 297 (2001);
Janet M. Branigan, Note, Michigan's Struggle with Assisted Suicide and Related
Issues as Illuminated by Current Case Law: An Overview of People v. Kevorkian,
72 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 959 (1995); Richard J. Brumbaugh, Comment, The
Oregon Death with Dignity Act: Reversal of the Department of Justice's Position on
Physician Assisted Suicide and the Ensuing Court Battle, 21 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L.
REV. 377 (2002); Stephanie A. Damiani, Comment, Up with Life and Down with
Pain: The Pain Relief Promotion Act: CongressionalAttempt to Address the Issue
of Physician-Assisted Suicide, 5 QUINNIPIAC HEALTH L.J. 191 (2001-02); Kelly
Green, Note, Physician-AssistedSuicide and Euthanasia: Safeguarding Against the
"Slippery Slope"-The Netherlands Versus the United States, 13 IND. INT'L & COMP.
L. REV 639 (2003); Stephanie Hendricks, Note, Pain Relief, Death with Dignity, and
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the Catholic Church, issued sanctity of life statements i'8 and
"vowed to wage an intensive legal, legislative and media
campaign against [PAD]. 185
The AIDS epidemic played a significant role in the PAD
debate in the 1980s and early 1990s.11 6 Because many of those

Commerce: The Constitutionality of CongressionalAttempts to Regulate PhysicianAssisted Suicide in Oregon via the Commerce Clause After Lopez and Morrison, 37
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 691 (2001); Philip King, Note, Washington v. Glucksberg:
Influence of the Court in Care of the Terminally Ill and Physician Assisted Suicide,
15 J.L. & HEALTH 271 (2000-01); Kathryn E. Mazzeo, Comment, The Right to Die
Versus the Right to Live-Who Decides? The Long and Wandering Road to a
Legislative Solution, 66 ALB. L. REV. 263 (2002); Recent Case, 118 HARV. L. REV.
1371 (2005).
184 See, e.g., Jimenez, supra note 155 ("[A]ll human life [is] a gift from God over
which we have stewardship but not absolute dominion." (quoting Bishop Leo
O'Neal of Roman Catholic Diocese of Manchester, N.H.)); U.S. Conference of
Catholic Bishops, Life at Risk (Nov. 1998), http://www.usccb.org/prolife/publicat/
liferisk/nov98.shtml (excerpts from the Bishops' Statement on the Sanctity of
Human Life); U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, Statement on Euthanasia (Sept.
12, 1991), http://www.usccb.org/prolife/issues/euthanas/euthnccb.shtml; Vatican,
Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith: Declaration on Euthanasia
(1980), http://www.vatican.va/roman-curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rccon
_cfaithdoc_19800505_euthanasia-en.html; see also Kevin D. O'Rourke, Physician
Assisted Suicide, A Religious Perspective, 15 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 433, 441-44
(1996).
185 Diego Ribadeneira, Bishops Hit Assisted Suicide, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 14,
1996, at A34. At their fall meeting in Boston, the U.S. Catholic bishops of the
Roman Catholic Church, "along with evangelical Christian denominations and
Muslim groups, recently filed briefs with the Supreme Court opposing doctorassisted suicide." Id. But cf JAMES M. HOEFLER, MANAGING DEATH 63 (1997)
("Now, most mainstream Catholic organizations have abandoned their
obstructionism of years past and joined forces with more progressive elements of
the debate ....).
186 Pratt, supra note 183, at 1029-32. But note that some of the impetus may have
died:
The effectiveness of the newly developed protease inhibitors in
combating AIDS and forestalling death may, for some members of the gay
community, lessen the sense of urgency to legalize PAS. However,
protease inhibitors are a limited, and as yet incomplete, solution to the
AIDS epidemic and are therefore unlikely to supplant entirely the interest
of the gay community in PAS. The tremendous expense of the drugs
precludes access to the medication for many persons who are HIV positive
or who have AIDS. Moreover, the efficacy of the drugs is highly
dependent upon a strict daily regimen that requires extreme punctuality
and coordination of eating and sleeping. Maintenance of this rigorous
regimen challenges even the most disciplined individuals. In addition, the
drugs are not effective for some individuals who take them faithfully, and
forty percent of all AIDS patients who take the drugs develop a resistance
to them. Thus, at least for the near future, AIDS still looms as a fatal
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infected with HIV/AIDS were young or middle-aged, the
demographic of those seeking PAD expanded beyond the
"infirm.' ' 87
and
"old"
vulnerable
more
traditionally

Furthermore, the "persistent questioning of authority by AIDS
activists and their skepticism toward 'standard medical
authority'.., resulted in a throwing off of that medical snobbery
which insists on life at any cost.' ' 188 AIDS activists added "well
organized and well financed legal and political clout to the legal
battles."' 8 9
The proponents of PAD argued that the right to refuse
medical treatment should logically be extended to a

constitutional right to use medical treatment to hasten death or
alternatively, a constitutional right to die. 19° In an effort to have
the courts recognize the right to die, these activists filed several
cases in the mid-1990s, challenging the constitutionality of laws

outlawing assisted suicide.

Some states were using assisted-

suicide bans to sanction physicians who wished to assist patients
in exercising the alleged right to die.19' The U.S. Supreme Court

resolved the debate in two of these cases by refusing to
death was a right protected by the
recognize that choosing
192
Federal Constitution.
disease of epidemic proportions, and it will continue to fuel the controversy
over legalizing PAS.
Id. at 1030-31 (footnotes omitted).
187 Id. at 1030; see Jeremy A. Sitcoff, Note, Death with Dignity: AIDS and a Call
for Legislation Securing the Right to Assisted Suicide, 29 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 677,
687-88 (1996).
188 Pratt, supra note 183, at 1029 (quoting Andrew Solomon, A Death of One's
Own, NEW YORKER, May 22, 1995, at 57, 57).
189 Id. at 1030. "Both the Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc. and
the National Association of People with AIDS filed amicus curiae briefs on behalf
of the plaintiffs in the New York and Washington PAS cases." Id. (citing Quill v.
Koppell, 870 F. Supp. 78 (S.D.N.Y. 1994); Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 850
F. Supp. 1454 (W.D. Wash. 1994)).
190 For proponents arguments, see generally Allen, supra note 183; Bix, supra
note 183; Cantor, supra note 171; Miller, A Death by Any Other Name, supra note
183; Miller, Escape from New York, supra note 183; Pratt, supra note 183; Batt,
supra note 183; Brumbaugh, supra note 183; Mazzeo, supra note 183.
191 See infra notes 268-80 and accompanying text for further discussion of state
assisted-suicide statutes.
192 See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 735 (1997). Kevorkian's efforts
to have the Michigan Supreme Court recognize a right to die failed when the court
found that the question was not void for vagueness and that there was no
Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest or equal protection violation. See infra
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In Quill v. Koppel, 93 a group of New York physicians filed
suit against the State of New York challenging New York's ban
on assisted suicide1 94 as violating the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. The physicians asserted that it
would be consistent with the standards of their medical practices
to prescribe lethal medication for mentally competent,
terminally ill patients who were suffering great pain and desired
a doctor's help in taking their own lives. 195 However, these same
physicians asserted that if they did prescribe lethal doses of
medication, they could be subject to prosecution under the
assisted-suicide laws.' 96 The crux of the physicians' argument
was that it was inconsistent for the State to allow a mentally
competent adult to decline life sustaining treatment while at the
same time barring such individuals from seeking assistance in
taking their lives.' 97 The district court granted summary
judgment in favor of the State, finding that the physicians'
arguments failed as a matter of law and that the state
198 statute was
unambiguous and did not violate the Constitution.
On appeal in Quill v. Vacco,' 99 the Second Circuit reversed.
The Second Circuit rejected a due process analysis similar to that
of the Cruzan Court and refused to hold that terminal patients
who chose to end their lives by self-administering prescribed
drugs enjoyed the same Cruzan due process right to hasten
death by removing life-support systems.
However, the Second Circuit did adopt an equal protection
analysis, agreeing with the doctors that the two groups were
similarly situated:

note 295. A case brought by a terminally ill patient and his doctor in Florida failed.
The Florida Supreme Court found that Florida's assisted-suicide ban did not violate
the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Florida Constitution's privacy clause. Krischer
v. McIver, 697 So. 2d 97, 99 (Fla. 1997); see also KRAUSKOPF ET AL., supra note 153,
§§ 13.11-13.27, at 488-502.
193 870 F. Supp. 78, 79 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), rev'd in part sub nom., Quill v. Vacco, 80
F.3d 716 (2d Cir. 1996), rev'd in part, 521 U.S. 793 (1997).
194 See N.Y. PENAL L. § 125.15 (McKinney 1999).
195 Quill, 870 F. Supp. at 80.
196 Id.

197 Id.

at 79.

198 Id.

199 80 F.3d 716 (2d Cir. 1996), rev'd in part.521 U.S. 793 (1997).
200 Id. at 728-29.
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[T]hose in the final stages of terminal illness who are on lifesupport systems are allowed to hasten their deaths by directing
the removal of such systems; but those who are similarly
situated, except for the previous attachment of life-sustaining
equipment, are not allowed2 0 1 to hasten death by selfadministering prescribed drugs.

Consequently, the Second Circuit concluded that, to the
extent the New York criminal statutes prohibited a physician
from prescribing medications to be self-administered by a
mentally competent person in the final stages of a terminal
illness, such statutes were not rationally related to any legitimate
state interest and violated the Equal Protection Clause.0 2
On certiorari in Vacco v. Quill, the U.S. Supreme Court
reversed, finding that the New York law did not violate the
Equal Protection Clause.2 3 The Court maintained that the
distinction between life-sustaining treatment and deathhastening treatment that warranted one to be recognized as a
fundamental right and the other not, also was a rational
distinction for equal protection purposes. 2014 Consequently, New
York's assisted-suicide statute, which could include PAD within
its prohibitions, did not infringe upon the basic right to refuse
life sustaining treatment, and New York's distinction between
the right to refuse treatment and assisted suicide was rational
and served an important public interest.2 5
On the very same day it decided Vacco, the Supreme Court
also issued its opinion on another challenge to an assistedsuicide ban in Washington v. Glucksberg.

6

A group of

Washington residents filed the suit asserting that a state law
207
208
banning assisted suicide was unconstitutional on its face.
The Ninth Circuit held, in an en banc decision, that patients have
a "due process liberty interest in controlling the time and

203

Id. at 729.
Id. at 727-31.
521 U.S. 793, 797 (1997).

204

See id. at 803-08.

205

Id. at 808-09.

206

521 U.S. 702 (1997).

201
202

207 WASH. REV. CODE ANN.

§ 9A.36.060(1) (West 1994).

Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 735. The Ninth Circuit had held that the statute's
categorical prohibition was unconstitutional as applied to a class rather than
individual plaintiffs. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 838 (9th Cir.
1996), rev'd sub nom., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
208
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manner of [their] death[s]-that there
is, in short, a
20 9
die.'
to
'right
recognized
constitutionally
The Supreme Court reversed, using the law's historical
rejection of suicide as a basis for refusing to recognize a liberty
interest under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 210

According to Justice Rehnquist's majority

opinion, if the right to assist with suicide did not rise to the level
of a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Due Process
Clause, then Washington's statute prohibiting it needed only to
be "rationally related to legitimate government interests." 21'1
Washington State's goals of preserving human life and upholding

the integrity and ethics of the medical profession were sufficient
to meet this simple relationship test to overcome the Fourteenth
Amendment challenge. 2
Remarkably, five justices filed concurring opinions, including
213
four concurrences that addressed both Glucksberg and Vacco.

While some of the justices expressed support for "personal
control over the manner of death,, 214 overall the justices

209 Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 816. The original lawsuit was brought by
four physicians and three terminally ill patients. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 707. The
patients died before the case reached the Ninth Circuit. See id. at 707-08.
210 See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 710-28. Arguably, the Supreme Court's opinion
rested on confused semantics. For example, the Court distinguished sexual acts by
consenting homosexuals from acts of "sodomy" in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558
(2003). By noting that "the concept of the homosexual as a distinct category of
person did not emerge until the late 19th century," the Court could ignore
traditional laws outlawing sodomy and conclude that "[t]he policy of punishing
consenting adults for private acts was not much discussed in the early legal
literature." Id. at 568-70. Similarly, if the Court had concluded that physicianassisted death was distinct from "suicide" as current medical organizations
conclude, cf. supra note 10, then the examination of traditional laws outlawing
suicide or assisted suicide would be irrelevant. See also Yale Kamisar, Can
Glucksberg Survive Lawrence? Another Look at the End of Life and Personal
Autonomy, 106 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2008) (noting "nobody was claiming a
right to a physician's assistance in committing suicide generally-only a right to a
physician's help in very special circumstances").
211 Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 728.
212 Id. at 735.
213 See generally id. at 736-92 (concurring opinions of Justices O'Connor,
Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer).
214 Id. at 789 (Ginsburg, J., concurring); see also id. at 744 (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (noting Cruzan's right rested also implicitly "on the even more
fundamental right to make this 'deeply personal decision"').
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concluded that the states' interests 21 5 and the availability of
216
outweighed recognizing a new unenumerated
alternatives
"right to commit suicide which itself includes a right to assistance
in doing so.,,217
Most notably for the federalism issue, the justices deferred
resolution of the PAD debate to the states by failing to
recognize a federal constitutional right in Glucksberg or Vacco.
Each of the separate opinions references in some way the
importance of allowing the states to address PAD.
For example, Chief Justice Rehnquist noted:
[Tihe States are currently engaged in serious, thoughtful
examinations of physician-assisted suicide and other similar
issues ....
Throughout the Nation, Americans are engaged in an
earnest and profound debate about the morality, legality, and
practicality of physician-assisted suicide. Our holding permits
this debate to continue, as it should in a democratic society. 18
Similarly, Justice O'Connor stated:

215 Washington's statute sought to protect vulnerable groups, such as the poor,
elderly, and disabled from abuse, neglect, and mistakes. Id. at 732 (majority
opinion). But see Miller, Escapefrom New York, supra note 183, at 779 (noting the
distinction that the Court drew in Vacco v. Quill was contrary to the reasons cited
by the Court in stating that the distinction protects vulnerable members of society).
All of the state interests identified by the Supreme Court in rejecting a right to
assisted suicide are "implicated to a higher degree by withdrawal of life support."
Id. "The primary reason for this difference is that withdrawal of life support often
involves incompetent patients and surrogate decision making while assisted suicide
by definition requires a competent patient choosing to hasten her death." Id. The
withdrawal of life support is much more akin to the "involuntary euthanasia
performed in the Netherlands" because that practice is often performed on
incompetent individuals. Id. at 806; see also Green, supra note 183, at 640-43
(attributing different views of when it is proper to end life to cultural differences
between the United States and the Netherlands and stating that the objective
requirements in the United States adequately protect against the "slippery slope"
that is the subjective practice in the Netherlands).
216 Several of the justices seemed persuaded by the availability of palliative care
to "alleviate suffering, even to the point of causing unconsciousness and hastening
death." Glucksberg,521 U.S. at 737 (O'Connor, J. joined by Breyer, J., concurring).
217 Id. at 723 (majority opinion).
218 Id. at 719, 735. If the Glucksberg Court had decided that assisted suicide was
a protected right, then the debate would have been resolved. In a subsequent case
on assisted suicide, the Ninth Circuit was explicit in "tak[ing] no position on the
merits or morality" of the issue. Oregon v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 1118, 1123 (9th Cir.
2004), affid sub nom., Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243 (2006).
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There is no reason to think the democratic process will not
strike the proper balance between the interests of terminally
ill, mentally competent individuals who would seek to end
their suffering and the State's interests in protecting those who
might seek to end life mistakenly or under pressure. As the
Court recognizes, States are presently undertaking extensive
and serious evaluation of physician-assisted suicide and other
related issues ....

In such circumstances, "the ... challenging

task of crafting appropriate procedures for safeguarding . . .
liberty interests is entrusted
to the 'laboratory' of the States...
219
in the first instance.
In addition, Justice Souter noted: "Legislatures, however, are
not so constrained [as the Court is in recognizing new
unenumerated rights]. The experimentation that should be out
of the question in constitutional adjudication displacing
legislative judgments is entirely proper, as well as highly
desirable, when the legislative
power addresses an emerging
' 22
issue like assisted suicide. , 0
Finally, Justice Stevens, in his concurrence, drew a parallel
with the changing approach society has taken with capital
punishment: "The Court ends its opinion with the important
observation that our holding today is fully consistent with a
continuation of the vigorous debate about the 'morality, legality,
and practicality of physician-assisted suicide' in a democratic
society.,221
If the Court had determined that assisted suicide was a
constitutional liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment, the debate over PAD would have been over.
Federal constitutional law then would have preempted any state
attempt to control PAD. The Court, however, declined to do so.
Instead, the Court recognized the tension created when public
"[a]ttitudes toward suicide itself have changed ...

but our laws

have consistently condemned, and continue to prohibit, assisting
suicide., 222 The Court's refusal to federalize the issue permitted

Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 737 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
Id. at 789 (Souter, J., concurring) ("The Court should accordingly stay its hand
to allow reasonable legislative consideration. While I do not decide for all time that
respondents' [due process] claim should not be recognized, I acknowledge the
legislative institutional competence as the better one to deal with that claim at this
time.").
221 Id. at 738 (Stevens, J., concurring).
222 Id. at 719 (majority opinion).
219
220
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the states to play their key role in resolving the debate by
experimenting with solutions.
But outside forces served to prevent the federalism model of

experimentation from working smoothly within the state
legislative process. Opponents of PAD applauded the Court's
decisions in Quill and Glucksberg, suggesting those decisions
were "a devastating blow to the movement., 22 3 These groups

also had filed amicus briefs in the key U.S. Supreme Court
cases 2

4

and stood ready to thwart any expansion of PAD by

asserting their influence at the state level through the pressurepoint process. 225
3. FederalLegislation

Although some members of Congress have attempted to use
federal legislation to shift control of PAD back to the federal

forum, their efforts have failed. Most of these federal attempts
to address PAD focused primarily on revisions to the existing
226
Controlled Substances Act,
which regulates drug use,
specifically some of the drugs used by physicians to assist

patients with dying. 27
In response to voter affirmation of Oregon's PAD initiative,
members of Congress introduced the Lethal Drug Abuse
Bailey, supra note 92.
E.g., Brief for the U.S. Catholic Conference et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioners, Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (No. 95-1858), 1996 WL 656248; Brief for the
U.S. Catholic Conference et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Vacco v.
Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1996) (No. 96-110), 1996 WL 650919.
225 E.g., Bailey, supra note 92 ("And [the Catholic Church and the California
Medical Society] hold sway here in the Capitol as well. This is going to be
something that's very difficult to accomplish legislatively.").
226 Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-904 (2006).
227 The Controlled Substances Act states that any schedule II drug, that is, drugs
that are only available through prescription, must be used for a "legitimate medical
purpose by an individual practitioner . . .acting in the usual course of [his]
professional practice." § 830. To prevent diversion of controlled substances, the
Controlled Substances Act regulates the activity of physicians, who must register in
accordance with rules and regulations promulgated by the Attorney General. § 822.
The Attorney General may deny, suspend, or revoke a registration that, as relevant
here, would be "inconsistent with the public interest." § 824(a)(4). In determining
consistency with the public interest, the Attorney General must consider several
factors, including a state's recommendation; compliance with state, federal, and
local law regarding controlled substances; and "public health and safety." § 823(f).
The Controlled Substances Act explicitly contemplates a role for the states as well
as the Attorney General in regulating controlled substances. See § 903.
223
224
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Prevention Act ("LDAPA") in 1998 as an amendment to the
Controlled Substances Act. 228 The purpose of this bill was to
"clarify Federal law to prohibit the dispensing or distribution of
a controlled substance for the purpose of causing, or assisting in
causing, the suicide or euthanasia of any individual. 22 9 The
proposed change would have allowed the Attorney General to
determine that registration of a medical practitioner is
inconsistent with the public interest if "the Attorney General
determines, based on clear and convincing evidence, that the
applicant is applying for the registration with the intention of
using the registration" to "intentionally . . . distribute[] a
controlled substance with a purpose of causing.., the suicide or
euthanasia" of a person. 230 The bill further would have allowed
the Attorney
General to"" revoke231 the registration of any such
offening
edicl
offending medical practitioners.
The LDAPA passed the
House of Representatives, but failed to make it out of the
Health and Human Services Committee when it reached the
232
Senate.
The year after the LDAPA failed, Congress considered the
Pain Relief Promotion Act ("PRPA") to support the use of
PAD. 233 This legislation proposed to amend the Controlled
Substances Act to allow palliative care by providing that
"alleviating pain or discomfort in the usual course of
professional practice is a legitimate medical purpose for the
dispensing, distributing, or administering of a controlled
substance that is consistent with public health and safety, even
if
23
the use of such a substance may increase the risk of death." 4
228 Lethal Drug Abuse Prevention Act (LDAPA) of 1998, H.R. 4006, 105th
Cong.
229 Id.
23 0

Id. § 2(a)(i)(2).
231 Id. § 2(b)(1).

232 See Valerie J. Vollmar, Recent Developments in Physician-Assisted Suicide
(Mar.

1999),

available at

http://www.willamette.edu/wucl/pdf/pas/1999-03.pdf

[hereinafter Vollmer, Mar. 1999, Developments].
233 Pain Relief Promotion Act (PRPA) of 1999, S. 1272, 106th Cong. Whereas
the LDAPA was opposed by the AMA because it feared "doctors would be

reluctant to prescribe adequate pain relief for suffering patients," the AMA and
National Hospice Association supported the PRPA. Stacy A. Tromble, Note, A
Dialogue on Death & Deference: Gonzales v. Oregon, 54 BUFF. L. REV. 1639,

1667-68 (2007).
234 S. 1272 § 101(i)(1); see also supra notes 10, 157-64 and accompanying text for
more discussion of palliative care.
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The PRPA bill had the twin aims of (1) promoting the use of
controlled substances in palliative care while expressly refusing
to create a federal right to use controlled substances in the
intentional taking of life,235 and (2) still recognizing state laws
that allowed such a right.2 36 This bill passed the House of
Representatives, and survived a divided vote in the Senate
Judiciary Committee, but failed to make it to the Senate floor.
In May 2006, Senator Sam Brownback, a Republican from
Kansas, chaired a hearing before the Senate Judiciary
Committee's Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil Rights,
and Property Rights.
This hearing was titled "The
237
Consequences of Legalized Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia.,
In August 2006, Senator Brownback introduced the Assisted
Suicide Prevention Act of 2006, but Oregon Senator Ron Wyden
threatened to filibuster if the bill came to a vote. 238 The bill was
never called, but Senator Brownback included federal
opposition to PAD as one of the platform issues in his bid for
the Republican presidential nomination in 2008.239
Although the 1998 and 1999 efforts to amend the Controlled
Substances Act made significant progress in Congress, neither of
these bills passed the congressional pressure points.
Furthermore, subsequent efforts at the national level also have

235 The bill noted that "nothing in this Act authorizes intentionally dispensing or

administering a controlled substance for purposes of causing death or assisting
another person in causing death." S. 1272 § 101(i)(2).
236

The PRPA required the Attorney General to give "no force and effect to

State law authorizing or permitting assisted suicide or euthanasia." Id. § 101(i)(2).
237 See Jeff Kosseff, GOP Puts Suicide Law in Spotlight, OREGONIAN, June 12,
2006, at Al.
238 Kansas Senator's Legislation Aims to Negate Assisted Suicide Law, REG.
GUARD (Eugene, Or.), Aug. 9, 2006, at Fl (noting the "public hold" on the bill

would prevent the legislation from being voted on unless sixty senators move to lift
it). The bill would have prohibited doctors from prescribing federally controlled

substances for the purpose of aid in dying. Id. Legislation would eviscerate the
Oregon law and impact patients nationwide by placing a punitive restriction on a
physician's ability to adequately treat pain at end of life. Id. The prepared
testimony and witness list from the hearing can be found on the U.S. Senate

Judiciary Committee's website at http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearing.cfm?id=1916
(last visited Aug. 4, 2007).
239 See Jeff Kosseff, Assisted Suicide May Become Newest GOP Campaign Issue,
RELIGION

NEWS,

visited Apr. 14, 2008).

http://pewforum.org/news/display.php?NewsID=10741

(last
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been unsuccessful, 4 ° thus ensuring for now, the significance of
federalism and state efforts in resolving the PAD debate.
B. On the State Side of the Federalism Balance: State Legislation
and Initiatives
Federalism traditionally relegated the resolution of issues
241
grounded in deep moral beliefs to the states.
To some, it has
been a stinging loss of self-government when unelected Supreme
Court justices determine the outcome of a moral debate by
declaring protections under the U.S. Constitution. 2 As Justice
Scalia observed in the context of abortion rights, when the Court
preempts these moral issues, it usurps "sovereignty over a field
where it has little proper business. ' , 24 3 Consequently, the PAD
240 The Supreme Court's holding in Gonzales v. Oregon, discussed infra notes
336-45, and the Terry Schiavo situation in Florida revived the PAD debate
nationally. See, e.g., William H. Colby, From Quinlan to Cruzan to Schiavo: What
Have We Learned, 37 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 279 (2006) (article adapted from speech
given by the attorney who represented Nancy Cruzan); Annie Danino, Dodging the
Issue of Physician Assisted Suicide: The Supreme Court's Likely Response in
Gonzales v. Oregon, 10 J. MED. & L. 299 (2006); David Sclar, U.S. Supreme Court
Ruling in Gonzales v. Oregon Upholds the Oregon Death with Dignity Act, 34 J.L.
MED. & ETHICS 639 (2006); Colburn, supra note 10.
There has also been PAD debate on the state level. See, e.g., Bill to Legalize
Assisted Suicide in California Rejected by Senate Judiciary Committee, U.S.
NEWSWIRE, June 27, 2006; Editorial, Capitol Watch: Death and Dignity, SEATTLE

POST-INTELLIGENCER, Feb. 9, 2006, at B6 ("Sen. Pat Thibaudeau, D-Seattle, has

introduced a sensitive, reasoned Washington death with dignity bill (SB 6843). It
has yet to get a hearing in the Senate Health Care Committee, chaired by fellow
Democrat Karen Keiser of Kent."); Edwin Garcia, Assisted Suicide Campaign Back
On, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Jan. 25, 2006; James J. Kilpatrick, Editorial, l0th
Amendment Was Cure for This Ill, AUGUSTA CHRON., Jan. 29, 2006, at A4 (noting
a Tenth Amendment argument could have prevented the Gonzales Court from
finding the way it did in Oregon, but that Congress surely has the federal commerce
power to regulate interstate commerce in deadly drugs); Clifford M. Kulwin,
Commentary: People Die Differently These Days, NEWHOUSE NEWS SERV., Feb. 2,
2006; Colin Nickerson, Suicide Groups Make Switzerland a Final Destination,
BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 26, 2006, at A12; Other States See Path in Ruling on Oregon's
Assisted Suicide Law, RELIGION NEWS SERV., Jan. 25, 2006; Robert Solomon,
Scalia's Flip-Flop on Assisted Suicide Is a Killer, CONN. L. TRIB., Jan. 30, 2006, at
23, 23; Sam Howe Verhovek, For Ex-Governor Who Advocates Right to Die,
PoliticalIs Personal,L.A. TIMES, Mar. 24, 2006, at A18.
241 See Terry Eastland, Shameless in Seattle, AM. SPECTATOR, July 1994, at 57, 57.
242 Id. at 58.
243 Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 532 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
concurring). Ninth Circuit Judge Tallman has also noted that "[t]he principle that
state governments bear the primary responsibility for evaluating physician assisted
suicide follows from our concept of federalism, which requires that state lawmakers,
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debate appears to be an excellent paradigm for restrained
federal power and an appropriate shift of weight back to the
state side of the federalism balance.
The PAD debate also illustrates the significant role that

citizen initiatives play in this federalism balance. Survey after
survey has shown that a majority of Americans nationwide
support patient self-determination for removing life support and
for some form of physician assistance in dying. 2" Despite this
popularity, not a single state has passed legislation explicitly
legalizing PAD in the thirty-plus years since Quinlan sensitized
the American public to the issue.
The influence of minority interest groups on key elected
officials best explains why the traditional legislative process has
failed. The first section below illustrates how religious groups,
such as the Catholic Church, 245 have used pressure points not
not the federal government, are the 'primary regulators of professional [medical]
conduct."' Oregon v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 1118, 1125 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Conant
v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629, 629 (9th Cir. 2002)) (alteration in original), aff'd sub nom.,
Gonzales v. Oregon 546 U.S. 243 (2006).
244 For example, the following polls all have shown a majority of adults support
physician-assisted death: (1) Gallup Poll of 1002 adults from May 8-11, 2006
(showing majorities of 64-69% approval to 27-31% disapproval); (2) CBS
News / New York Times polls of 1229 adults from June 1990 to January 2006
(showing majorities of 46-58% approval to 36-45% disapproval); (3) Fox News
survey of 900 registered voters in October 2005 (showing majorities of 48-52%
approval to 37-39% disapproval); and (4) Harris Poll of 1010 adults from 1983 to
April 2005 (showing majorities of 53-73% approval to 24-34% disapproval). See
National Polls on Euthanasia, http://www.euthanasiaprocon.org/poll.html (last
visited July 17, 2007). In addition, a Pew Research Center poll from November 927, 2005, showed the impact of how questions are asked. Id. In 2005, 51%
approved and 40% opposed "[mlaking it legal for doctors to give terminally ill
patients the means to end their lives," while 44% approved and 48% opposed in
response to "[m]aking it legal for doctors to assist terminally ill patients in
committing suicide." Id. Similarly, an ABC News poll of 1021 adults in March 2002
found closer margins for and against PAD depending on the question wording. Id.
245 Sources cited throughout this Article identify the "Catholic Church," the
"Roman Catholic Church," the "U.S. Conference of Bishops" (the Catholic
Church's lobbying arm), and other organizations predominated by Catholics as the
key opponents of PAD. Consequently, this Article will sometimes use the term
"Catholic Church" or "Church" generically to reference these organizations. This
Article also uses broader generic terms, such as "religious groups," when others
have joined the Catholic Church; however, it should be noted that not all religious
groups oppose PAD. For example, in June of 2006, the "United Church of Christ
(UCC) moved to begin an in-depth study and discussion of supporting a terminally
ill patient's right to request medication to hasten death," with a report due in 2009.
UCC Calls for Groundbreaking Study of Aid in Dying, THOUGHT & ACTION
http://www
2007,
July
Colo.),
Denver,
&
Choices,
(Compassion
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only to block PAD legislation, but also to successfully push
through legislation in two states that criminalize PAD.
The second section below addresses how PAD has fared in
the context of citizen initiatives. Despite some failures, the
citizen initiative process has been the only mechanism to
successfully enact legislation reflecting what polls suggest is the
preference of the majority of Americans with respect to PAD.
In 1994, a majority of citizen voters adopted an initiative
creating Oregon's PAD statute. Three years later, an even
larger majority of citizen voters reaffirmed their support for
PAD by refusing to repeal Oregon's act even though religious
group contributions to the repeal campaign exceeded those of
PAD supporters more than six-to-one.
Finally, the last section will show how the U.S. Supreme
Court's treatment of challenges to Oregon's Act leaves open the
opportunity for federalism to work: states may resolve the
controversial PAD issue by allowing Oregon to serve as a
Brandeis laboratory for experimentation.
1. Action by State Legislators

The traditional legislative process is often an ineffective forum
for resolving some issues, particularly controversial social issues.
In experimental areas, legislative inertia may be driven by
controversy over a topic. Because their voting records are public
information, legislators often are unwilling to put controversial
matters up for a vote, fearing repercussions from their political
party or, when seeking reelection, from influential contributors.
Because the issue is controversial, state legislatures have been
unsuccessful in enacting any legislation legalizing PAD. Instead,
interest groups have been able to use the legislative pressure
points not only to block efforts to legalize PAD but also to assert
their influence through the legislative process to enact laws that
penalize those who might act according to the majority view.
Religious groups are leading this legislative campaign, and one
commentator noted that "the Roman Catholic Church and its
primary lobbying arm, the U.S. Conference of Bishops, has
.compassionandchoices.org/newsletter/newsletter07O7.html; see also HOEFLER,
supra note 185, at 63-70 (describing the evolution of the Catholic Church's position
on PAD and the positions of other religions in the PAD debate). For purposes of
this Article, it is irrelevant which specific group is using the pressure point process,
only that the group represents the view of a powerful minority interest.
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proved to be an interest group without rival on the right-to-die
issue.,246
Before Quinlan and Cruzan, states had no statutes on the
books to address the new situation of a physician assisting a
patient with death. The issue only gained prominence when
modern medicine made the artificial prolonging of life a more

common occurrence.247 Although the Catholic Church fought to
oppose living wills that allow patients to refuse medical

treatment, it compromised on some legislation due to pressure
that courts would invalidate any statute that overly restricted
this fundamental right recognized in Cruzan.248
California passed the first living will statute in 1976. 249 The
Quinlan case "created a window of opportunity" for the
California legislature to pass its Natural Death Act even though
proponents had introduced the bill before Quinlan was
decided. 250 Following California's Natural Death Act of 1976,
sixty-one other living will bills were introduced in forty-two
states.25 1 Although the 1976 version of California's Act did not
address many of the issues doctors faced with end of life care,

subsequent efforts to amend it have been caught in the
legislative

pressure-point

web.

For example, a proposed

246 Hoefler, supra note 27, at 163; see also Catholic Church Alters Tactics on
Suicide Law, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 1, 1997, at B4 (explaining that although other
religious organizations, such as the Mormon Church, were involved in the 1997
effort to repeal Oregon's Pro-PAD law, the Catholic Church remained "the
dominant financial player" in that election); Gail Kinsey Hill & Ashbel S. Green,
Groups Reveal Details of Financingto Fight Initiative Measures, OREGONIAN, Oct.
11, 1994, at B5 (noting in the 1994 campaign for Oregon's pro-PAD Measure 16,
just three Catholic organizations contributed more than all of the proponent
contributions combined, and overall opponents outspent proponents almost four to
one).
247 But note, however, some state efforts to legalize various forms of PAD date
back to the early 1900s. In 1906, for example, the Ohio legislature considered and
rejected a bill that would have allowed doctors to end patients' lives as comfortably
as possible. Glynn, supra note 150, at 349-50.
248

See HENRY R. GLICK, THE RIGHT TO DIE 96 (1992).

Id. at 99.
Id. at 98.
251 Id. at 99. Glick argues that the Natural Death Act did not solve many of the
issues faced by doctors in dying situations such as how to deal with patients who
have not signed a directive, the determination of terminal cases, or patients in
permanent vegetative states. Id. Doctors were still concerned about liability and
seventy-five percent said they would continue to treat patients despite a request not
to be treated. Id.
249

250
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amendment passed through the California legislature in 1988,
but pro-life supporters were able to use the gubernatorial veto
252
pressure point to stop that legislation.
The Florida Catholic Conference ("FCC") took credit for
lobbying to kill a living will bill that passed through a Senate
committee in Florida in 1973 by "persuading conservative Senate
leadership to block the bill" and to allow it to "die[] on the
calendar a week before the end of the legislative session., 253 In
subsequent years, the FCC was bolstered with information from
the National Conference of Catholic Bishops and was able to
ensure that similar bills died in committee or on the floor.254
More than ten years later, only after pressure from court
decisions that "promoted the right to die at a level well beyond
that which state legislatures probably would approve if state
Catholic conferences lobbied for restrictive provisions and
participated actively in bill drafting," did the FCC reconsider its
position. 2 15 Even when the Florida legislature passed a living will
bill more closely tracking the rights outlined in Florida court
holdings, the opponents were able to use the gubernatorial veto
256
pressure point to prevent that bill from becoming law.
Only a
later compromise bill survived because it provided more
limitations than
the court holdings recognized and the FCC did
257
not oppose it.
The California and Florida examples represent a pattern of
effort by religious groups to restrict the right to refuse medical
treatment. Even though the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized
this right as constitutionally protected, these minority view
groups have employed the traditional legislative process to enact

252

Id. at 104. The California Catholic Conference did not use its pressure point

influence to stop the bill in the legislature because it was "better than more extreme
alternatives, specifically the assisted suicide proposal endorsed by the Hemlock
Society." /d. However, the Committee on Moral Concerns and the California ProLife Council convinced Republican Governor George Deukmejian to veto the law.
Id.
253 Id. at 107.
254

Id. at 108.

255 Id. at 113.

256 Id. at 116 (noting Governor Bob Martinez, a conservative Republican, vetoed
the legislation).
257 Id. at 117.
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laws to minimize exercise of that right.258 Furthermore, because
the Supreme Court failed to recognize a constitutional right to
die in Quill and Glucksberg, these religious groups have been
even more effective at blocking statutes attempting to legalize
PAD.
Several bills to enact statutes that specifically would authorize
PAD have been proposed in state legislatures, but none has
been successful.259 Many of these efforts started in the early
1990s and continue today. State legislators in Connecticut, Iowa,
Maine, New Hampshire, Virginia, and Washington have all
submitted bills supportive of PAD, but opponents prevented this
legislation from becoming law.260 Two Wisconsin legislators
have sponsored pro-PAD bills for more than ten years, but they
have never gotten one to a vote.261 Similarly in 2007, Arizona,
Hawaii, and Vermont all considered bills to legalize PAD, but
none of these were able to advance to a full vote.262
Although in some instances specific religious groups have
been prominent in their opposition, in other situations, their
impact on the pressure points of the legislative process may be
less obvious as they have "lowered their public profiles and
played down the moral arguments that dominated their [earlier]
effort[s].,,263 Still, recent attempts to pass a pro-PAD law in the
California legislature illustrate that the Catholic Church remains
actively involved in blocking such measures.

258 Id. at 119 ("The struggle for the last word on the right to die shifts back and
forth between the courts and the legislature [in Florida] ....The strategy of the
FCC, which has been the most prominent force in Florida's right to die politics, is to
resist enlarging the right to die until expansive judicial policy is expected. Then, the
FCC compromises on legislative measures that do not go as far as the appellate
courts."). Furthermore, when the legislature goes beyond its comfort level, the
FCC further "seeks to limit [the legislation's] impact by lobbying administrative
agencies for restrictive rules." Id. For additional examples of Catholic Church
interference with living-will legislation in Massachusetts, see id. at 120, and in
Pennsylvania, see Hoefler, supra note 27, at 164.
259 Colburn, supra note 10 ("In all, 18 states have seen ballot measures proposed
or bills introduced on assisted suicide."); see also Tromble, supra note 233, at 167273.
260 See Jimenez, supra note 155.
261 Vollmar, May 2007 Developments, supra note 10.
262 See id.
263 Catholic Church Alters Tactics on Suicide Law, supra note 246.
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California legislators introduced AB 374, a bill that would

legalize PAD, in January of 2007.64 When AB 374 moved
forward by a 7-3 vote in the California Assembly Judiciary
Committee in April of 2007, Catholic Cardinal Roger Mahoney
"charg[ed] supporters of the bill with participating in a 'culture
of death' and the legislation with being against 'God's law and
God's plan.' ' '265 The Assembly Speaker, Fabian Ntifiez, is a
Catholic, and the Church asserted pressure directly at him and
other Catholics in the California Assembly, encouraging parish
priests to distribute "flyers calling NiIfiez a 'killer,' and

threatening to withhold the sacrament of communion from any
266
lawmaker voting for the Compassionate Choices Act.,
Support for AB 374 waned, and the bill was never brought to a
vote 267
.
Aside from blocking legislation that would support PAD,
opponents have been able to influence the legislative process to

further discourage its use by doctors. Without majority support
to pass legislation specifically prohibiting PAD, individuals and

264 Vollmar, May 2007 Developments, supra note 10. The California legislature
has attempted to pass PAD legislation in several sessions, but each time it was
blocked. For example, in 1999, the California legislature tried two times to pass
PAD measures. Even with over seventy percent of the public supporting the
measures, bills did not get put up for a vote. Valerie J. Vollmar, Recent
Developments in Physician-Assisted Suicide (June 1999), http://www.willamette
.edu/wucl/pdf/pas/1999-06.pdf. There was a renewed effort to change California's
assisted-suicide statute in January 2006 following the Supreme Court decision in
Gonzales v. Oregon. The California state legislature introduced AB 651 in January,
and revised the bill in June 2006, but this legislation also failed to get through. See
Valerie J. Vollmar, Recent Developments in Physician-Assisted Suicide (July 2007),
http://www.willamette.edu/wucl/pdf/pas/2006-07.pdf. Therefore, the current law in
California, as written in the California Penal Code, states that "[e]very person who
deliberately aids, or advises, or encourages another to commit suicide, is guilty of a
felony." CAL. PENAL CODE § 401 (West 2006).
265 CaliforniaAB 374 Supporters Stand Up for Religious Freedom, THOUGHT &
ACTION (Compassion & Choices, Denver, Colo.), Apr. 2007, http://www
.compassionandchoices.org/newsletter/newsletter0407.html.
266 Barbara Coombs Lee, On My Mind, THOUGHT & ACTION (Compassion &
Choices, Denver, Colo.), Apr. 2007, http://www.compassionandchoices.org/
newsletter/newsletter0407.html.
267 Vogel, supra note 154 (noting the bill's authors, knowing that they did not
have the support to pass the legislation, failed to bring it for a vote). The Catholic
Church also blocked prior bills to legalize PAD, such as AB 1592, which was
attacked by the Roman Catholic Church in hearings before the Assembly Judiciary
Committee in 1999. Gladstone, supra note 155.
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interest groups who opposed the practice turned to age-old
assisted-suicide statutes.
Every state except Hawaii, Nevada, Utah, and Wyoming has
addressed assisted suicide in some way, either through the
268
common law or through statute.
Historically, these statutes

268 Before 1996, thirty-three states criminalized assisted suicide by statute. Kevin
M. Stansbury, Note, Physician Assisted Suicide-Due Process, The Right to Die,
Equal Protection and Slippery Slopes, 31 LAND & WATER L. REV. 623, 637 n.132
(1996).
This list, compiled by Stansbury, includes:
ALASKA STAT. §
11.41.100(a)(1)(B) (1994) (first degree murder); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 131103(3) (1989) (manslaughter); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-10-104(a)(2) (1987)
(manslaughter); CAL. PENAL CODE § 401 (West 1999) (separate crime, felony);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-104(1)(b) (1986) (manslaughter); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 53a-56(a)(2) (West 1994) (manslaughter in the second degree); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 11, § 645 (1994) (separate crime, felony); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.08 (West
1982) (separate crime, felony); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-5 (1995) (separate crime,
felony); HAW. REV. STAT. § 707-702(1)(b) (1993) (manslaughter); 720 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. § 5/12-31 (West 1995) (separate crime, felony if suicide is successful,
misdemeanor if suicide unsuccessful); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-1-2.5 (West 1994)
(separate crime, felony); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3406 (1992) (separate crime,
felony); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:32.12 (1996) (manslaughter); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 17-A, § 204 (1993) (separate crime, felony); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW
§ 3-102 (LexisNexis 1995) (reckless endangerment); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.215
(West 1994) (separate crime, felony); MISS. CODE. ANN. § 97-3-49 (West 1994)
(separate crime, felony); Mo. REV. STAT. § 565.023(2) (1992) (voluntary
manslaughter); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-105 (1993) (separate crime, felony); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 28-307 (1989) (separate crime, felony); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630:4
(1994) (separate crime, felony); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2c:11-6 (West 1994) (separate
crime, felony); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-2-4 (West 1994) (separate crime, felony);
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 120.30 (McKinney 1987) (separate crime, felony); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 12.1-16-04 (1993) (separate crime, felony); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 813
(West 1993) (separate crime, felony); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2505 (1993) (separate
crime, felony if suicide is successful, misdemeanor if suicide attempt is
unsuccessful); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-1090 (1999) (misdemeanor); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS § 22-16-37 (1993) (separate crime, felony); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-216
(1995) (separate crime, felony); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.08 (Vernon 1994)
(separate crime, felony if suicide is successful, misdemeanor if suicide attempt is
unsuccessful); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.36.060 (West 1988) (separate crime,
felony); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.12 (West 1982) (separate crime, felony).
Since 1996, four additional states have criminalized physician-assisted suicide.
Glynn, supra note 150, at 333 n.27. These state laws include: IOWA CODE ANN. §§
707A.2, 707A.3 (West 1997) (separate crime, felony); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §
216.302 (West 1994) (separate crime, felony); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 752.1027
(West 1992) (separate crime, felony); and R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 11-60-1, 11-60-3
(1997) (separate crime, felony).
The District of Columbia has not addressed the issue, while Alabama, Idaho,
Massachusetts, North Carolina, Ohio, and Vermont only provide a common law
remedy. See State Laws on Assisted-Suicide, http://www.euthanasiaprocon.org/
statelaws.htm (last visited July 19, 2007).
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situations, not PAD.269

Some
jurisdictions held that because suicide was not a crime, aiding in
it also was not criminal. ° Other jurisdictions considered motive
arose to address "suicide"

and found liability only if the one assisting intended to selfishly
benefit from the death of another. 27' The Model Penal Code
suggests that aiding in suicide will be criminal homicide only if
the party assisting caused the suicide "by force, duress or
deception., 272
Commentaries on this section of the Code
explained that liability is limited to purposeful conduct because
merely creating the risk that another will commit suicide would
cast the net of liability too wide. 273 None of the Code sections

specifically addressed involvement by a physician.
Despite the fact that these statutes were not enacted to
address the distinct situations doctors faced with patients whose

deaths were now being prolonged by modern medicine,
prosecutors in some states began to use the assisted-suicide
statutes on the books to deter PAD. Although states have
brought unsuccessful actions, 274 Michigan, California, and
Kansas indicted physicians for assisting in suicide in violation of
275
state laws.
Furthermore, physicians and patients who feared
potential sanctions under the assisted-suicide statutes were the
primary instigators of litigation challenging these statutes in
Alaska, Colorado, Florida, Michigan, New York, and
276
Washington.
269 See supra note 10 and accompanying text for discussion of confusion created
by using the term "suicide" to address PAD; see also Cohen et al., supra note 153, at
89 ("To avoid ambiguity in our survey, instead of 'physician-assisted suicide,' we
used the phrase 'prescription of medication ...or the counseling of an ill patient so
he or she may use an overdose to end his or her own life."').
270 See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.5 cmt. 5, at 100 n.22 (1980).
271 See, e.g., id. § 210.5 cmt. 5, at 101 n.24.
272 Id. § 210.5(1); see also id. § 210.5 cmt. 5, at 100 ("[T]he interests in the sanctity
of life that are represented by the criminal homicide laws are threatened by one
who expresses a willingness to participate in taking the life of another, even though
the act may be accomplished with the consent, or at the request, of the suicide
victim."); DAVID C. BRODY ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW 93 (2001).
273 MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.5 cmt. 5, at 102.
274 See, e.g., State v. Naramore, 965 P.2d 211, 224 (Kan. Ct. App. 1998); People v.
Kevorkian, 519 N.W.2d 890, 890 (Mich. 1994).
275 See, e.g., infra notes 291-96.
276 See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 707-08 (1997); Vacco v.
Quill, 521 U.S. 793,796-97 (1996); Sampson v. Alaska, 31 P.3d 88, 90 (Alaska 2001);
Sanderson v. People, 12 P.3d 851, 852 (Colo. Ct. App. 2000); Krischer v. Mclver,
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In an effort to restrict PAD, a few states have modified their
assisted-suicide laws to specifically mention health care
providers. Virginia has enacted a law that subjects licensed
health care providers who have engaged in assisting suicide or
attempted suicide to the possibility of license revocation or civil
liability. 277 Ohio amended its assisted-suicide statute in 2006 to
permit injunctions against health
care providers who may be
•• 2781
attempting to assist with a suicide.
In the opposite direction, several states responded after the
Cruzan decision by modifying their assisted-suicide statutes to
include specific provisions to protect health care providers.
After Cruzan, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, and Louisiana all
amended their laws. Originally, these laws did not specifically
address health care providers. After 1990, legislators in these
states amended their assisted-suicide statutes to exclude 279from
prosecution health care providers acting under a living will.
Colorado, Maryland, Minnesota, Oklahoma, South Carolina,
and Tennessee all went a step further by attempting to address
the gray area between PAD and palliative care that may hasten
death. These states now provide exemptions from the assistedsuicide statutes for physicians or other health care workers who
may cause death while alleviating pain so long as their intent was
not to cause death knowingly.2 °
697 So. 2d 97, 99 (Fla. 1997); People v. Kevorkian, 519 N.W.2d 890, 890 (Mich.
1994).
277 VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-662.1(D) (1999) ("A licensed health care provider who
assists or attempts to assist a suicide shall be considered to have engaged in
unprofessional conduct for which his certificate or license to provide health care
services in the Commonwealth shall be suspended or revoked by the licensing
authority.").
278 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3795.02 (West 2006).
279 GEORGIA CODE ANN. § 16-5-5 (West 1995); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/1231 (West 1995); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-1-2.5(a) (West 1994); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 14:32.12 (1995). Note that "living wills" are also sometimes referred to as
advanced directives or advanced health care directives.
280 See COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-104 (2006); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM LAW § 3103 (West 2006); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 605.215(3)(2005); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-31090(C) (2006); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-216(b) (2006). Oklahoma's statute is
somewhat ambiguous; it is titled "Assisted Suicide Prevention Act of 1998," and on
its face prohibits PAD, yet it also has a very broad exception for palliative care,
placing it on the protective side for doctors. OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 3141.4 (2006).
Similarly, in Maryland in 1998, the Maryland Catholic Conference began working
with hospice organizations and other groups to introduce a bill that would outlaw
physician-assisted suicide. Valerie J. Vollmar, Recent Developments in Physician-
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Finally, not only have opponents been successful in blocking
legislation legalizing PAD, they also have pushed their cause to

the other extreme, attempting to pass legislation specifically
targeting doctors who respond to patients' requests for PAD.
Since 1996, Alabama, Arkansas, North Carolina, North Dakota,
and Vermont have had bills introduced that would specifically

criminalize PAD.

None have passed. 8

However, in Rhode

Assisted Suicide (Feb. 1998), http://www.willamette.edu/wucl/pdf/pas/1998-02.pdf
[hereinafter Vollmar, Feb. 1998 Developments]. A bill banning physician-assisted
suicide and imposing harsh criminal penalties of prison time and fines passed both
legislative houses and was signed into law by Governor Glendening on May 27,
1999. Valerie J. Vollmar, Recent Devdlopments in Physician-Assisted Suicide
However, the
(June 1998), http://www.willamette.edu/wucl/pdflpas/1998-06.pdf.
palliative care provision provides some protection for Maryland physicians.
281 Alabama: "In February 2000, the Alabama Senate passed Senate Bill 8, which
would make assisted suicide a Class C felony punishable by up to 10 years in prison.
However, the bill died in the House." Valerie J. Vollmar, Recent Developments in
Physician-Assissted Suicide (Nov. 2000), http://www.willamette.edu/wucl/pdf/pas/
2000-11.pdf [hereinafter Vollmar, Nov. 2007 Developments].
Arkansas: "On February 10, 1999, Arkansas state representatives passed a bill
that would make it a felony for a physician to carry out a medical procedure or
prescribe drugs for the purpose of ending a patient's life. The bill was sent to the
Senate on a vote of 89 to 3 .... " But, the bill was never enacted. See Vollmar, Mar.
1999 Developments, supra note 232.
North Carolina: On February 20, 2003, North Carolina State "Senators Jim
Forrester and Bill Purcell, both physicians, filed S.B. 145, which would make
assisted suicide by a licensed health care professional a Class D felony. The bill was
referred to committee .... ." but did not pass. Valerie J. Vollmar, Recent
Developments in Physician-Assisted Suicide (June 2003), http://www.willamette
.edu/wucl/pdf/pas/2003-06.pdf.
Subsequently, the Executive Council of the Elder Law Section of the North
Carolina Bar Association adopted a resolution "oppos[ing] enactment of S.
145 or any other felony law that purports to bar 'assisted suicide,"'
primarily due to concern that the bill might affect the quality of end-of-life
care. The bill was referred to the Judiciary Committee and was not
considered further in the 2003-04 session. The Health Law Section and the
Estate Planning Section also voted to oppose the bill, and the North
Carolina Bar Association's Board of Governors voted in April 2004 to
oppose it when reintroduced in the 2004-05 legislative session.
Valerie J. Vollmar, Recent Developments in Physician-Assisted Suicide (Oct.
2004), http://www.willamette.edu/wucl/pdf/pas/2004-10.pdf (alteration in original)
(noting the bill did not make it out of committee).
North Dakota: "Senator Ralph Kilzer... introduced a bill in the North Dakota
legislature that would revoke a health care provider's license for assisting in a
suicide and would make the provider liable to pay damages in any potential
lawsuits." Vollmar, Mar. 1999 Developments, supra note 232 (the bill did not pass).
Vermont: In February 2003 H. 318 was introduced in the Vermont legislature to
criminalize PAD. The Senate and House Health and Welfare Committees failed to
bring the bill for a vote in both 2003 and when reintroduced in 2004. See Valerie J.
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Island and Michigan, legislators specifically made it a crime for a
2812
health care provider to "assist" in suicide.
In 1996, the Rhode Island legislature considered one bill
making PAD a felony and another bill that would legalize PAD.
Although Rhode Island has the largest Catholic constituency in

Vollmar, Recent Developments in Physician-Assisted Suicide (June 2005),
http://www.willamette.edu/ wucl/pdf/pas/2005-06.pdf.
282 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 752.1027 (West 2006); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-60-3
(2006). The Rhode Island statute states:
An individual or licensed health care practitioner who with the purpose of
assisting another person to commit suicide knowingly:
(1) Provides the physical means by which another person commits or
attempts to commit suicide; or
(2) Participates in a physical act by which another person commits or
attempts to commit suicide is guilty of a felony and upon conviction may be
punished by imprisonment for up to ten (10) years, by a fine of up to ten
thousand dollars ($10,000) or both.
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-60-3.
The Michigan statute provides:
A person who has knowledge that another person intends to commit or
attempt to commit suicide and who intentionally does either of the
following is guilty of criminal assistance to suicide, a felony punishable by
imprisonment for not more than 4 years or by a fine of not more than
$2,000.00, or both:
(a) Provides the physical means by which the other person attempts or
commits suicide.
(b) Participates in a physical act by which the other person attempts or
commits suicide.
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 752.1027. The current version of this statute has both
an advance directive and palliative care exception. See id. §§ 752.1027(2), (3).
However, the court held that a similar exception in the pre-1993 version of the
statute did not apply to Dr. Kevorkian because he administered medication
designed to cause death. See People v. Kevorkian, 639 N.W.2d 291, 302 (Mich. Ct.
App. 2001). The pre-1993 version of the statute read as follows:
A licensed health care professional who administers, prescribes, or
dispenses medications or procedures to relieve a person's pain or
discomfort, even if the medication or procedure may hasten or increase the
risk of death, is not guilty of assistance to suicide under this section unless
the medications or procedures are knowingly and intentionally
administered, prescribed, or dispensed to cause death.
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 752.1027(3) (West 1992). Cf GA. CODE ANN. § 6-5-15
(West 1998) (does not explicitly mention health care providers, but makes it illegal
for any individual to hold himself or herself out as offering that he or she will
intentionally and actively assist another person in the commission of suicide and
committing any overt act to further that purpose); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 216.302
(1994) (does not specifically address healthcare providers, but makes providing the
means of suicide a felony).
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the United States,
Senator Roney, a PAD advocate noted,
"We are here today as legislators. We are not here as Catholics,
Jews or Protestants . . . . We do not have the luxury of
attempting to impose our religious views on others. ' '2"4 Despite
Senator Roney's pleas, the Rhode Island legislators passed the
anti-PAD legislation, "signal[ing their] full sympathy with
Catholic Church representatives and other opponents of assisted
suicide who packed a third-floor State House room for the
hearing [on a bill making PAD a felony]." 2 8
Michigan is a special case. Although many would argue that
Michigan doctor Jack Kevorkian's actions did more harm than
good in the PAD debate, no discussion of the topic would be
complete without mentioning his involvement.
From 1990 to
1998, • Dr.
claimed to have assisted in over 130
. 287 Kevorkian
suicides,
three using his "suicide machine. 2 8
After early

attempts to charge Kevorkian
with murder under the existing
e ,
.289
assisted-suicide law failed,
the Michigan General Assembly
made its statute more restrictive in 1992.290 The statute states

that any person is guilty of a felony if that person, with
knowledge of another person's intent or attempt to commit
suicide, provides "physical means" or "physical acts" to aid the
suicide. 9 '
283 GLICK, supra note 248, at 124 ("[T]he Catholic church has direct access and
enormous influence in the legislature, and all observers and participants agree that
it is able to block or postpone legislation that it opposes .... [T]he Catholic
constituency of Massachusetts is the second largest in the United States-the
population is over 50 percent Catholic, second only to Rhode Island."). "As in
other states, the Massachusetts Catholic Conference has been the main and the
most powerful opponent to the right to die .... Id. at 120.
284 Rowland, supra note 163.
285

Id.

286 For more detailed discussion on the impact of Kevorkian actions see generally
ELIZABETH ATWOOD GAILEY, WRITE TO DEATH (2003); George J. Annas, The

"Right to Die" in America: Sloganeering from Quinlan and Cruzan to Quill and
Kevorkian, 34 DUo. L. REV. 875, 891-92 (1996); Persels, supra note 183; Branigan,
supra note 183;.
287 See Ron Dzwonkowski, Kevorkian Timeline, DET. FREE PRESS, Dec. 13, 2006,
at B6.

288 Persels, supra note 183, at 95.
289 See id.
290 See Catherine L. Annas, Irreversible Error: The Power and Prejudice of
Female Genital Mutilation, 12 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 325, 340 (1996).
291 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 752.1027 (West 2006). Michigan's assisted-suicide

statute was enacted in February of 1993. It was not repealed after six months as
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After the statute was amended, Dr. Kevorkian assisted in

three more suicides and was indicted under the new law.29 On
appeal, the Supreme Court of Michigan held that the statute was
properly enacted and that the imposition of criminal penalties on
an individual who assists in the suicide of another does not
violate the U.S. Constitution.

293

In addition, Kevorkian went a

step further when he administered a lethal injection to a patient
with terminal cancer, an event that was videotaped and later
aired on CBS's 60 Minutes.294 Kevorkian's attempt to enjoin
prosecution failed after the Michigan Supreme Court upheld the
state's assisted-suicide statute.29

5

As a result, Dr. Kevorkian was

convicted of second degree murder and served over eight years
of his ten to twenty-five year prison sentence. 296 He was paroled
in June of 2007 for health reasons.297
Assisted-suicide statutes that threaten sanctions for physicians
and criminalize decisions about patient care have a chilling effect
on doctors.
Thus, the inability of state legislatures to resolve
provided for in subsection 5 because the Michigan Supreme Court found it was
validly enacted and did not violate the U.S. Constitution. People v. Kevorkian, 527
N.W.2d 714, 719 (Mich. 1994).
292 Branigan, supra note 183, at 962-63.
293 Kevorkian, 527 N.W.2d at 716.
294 Jail Time for Dr. Kevorkian, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 1999, at A30 (noting Dr.
Kevorkian was acquitted in the 1994 killing of Thomas Hyde; however, after CBS
aired portions of a video depicting Dr. Kevorkian assisting in the suicide of Thomas
Youk, Dr. Kevorkian was again indicted and this time convicted of second degree
murder and distribution of controlled substances).
295 Kevorkian v. Thompson, 947 F. Supp. 1152, 1171-72 (E.D. Mich. 1997)
(following the Michigan Supreme Court precedent that there was no Fourteenth
Amendment liberty interest in assisted suicide, that Michigan's statute did not
violate Equal Protection, and that Michigan common law was not unconstitutionally
vague on the topic).
296 See Kevorkian Leaving Prison in June, DENVER POST, Dec. 14, 2006, at 2A.
297 Prison officials in Lansing, Michigan, decided to grant him parole after more
than eight years behind bars. Id. They considered seventy-eight-year-old
Kevorkian's health and the unlikelihood that he would pose a danger to society if
freed. Id.
298 See Press Release, Edward L. Langston, Am. Med. Ass'n, AMA: Justice
Served for Dr. Pou (July 24, 2007), http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/category/
17849.html. In a press release after a grand jury refused to indict Dr. Anna Pou, the
AMA stated, "The AMA continues to be very concerned about criminalizing
decisions about patient care .... " Id. Dr. Pou was charged with injecting four
elderly patients with "lethal cocktails" during the August 2005 Katrina storm. Mary
Foster, No Indictment for Doctoring Katrina Deaths, DENVER POST, July 25, 2007,
at 9A. Some charged that Dr. Pou administered the injections as mercy killings, but
the doctor said the patients wished to die naturally and she did all she could to

2007]

Fast-FoodGovernment and Physician-AssistedDeath

the PAD issue has made it "difficult for clinicians to deliver
care"'299 or to prescribe what they believe is the most humane
and appropriate treatment for their patients.
2. Action by Citizen Initiatives
While pro-PAD supporters pushed the debate in legislatures

and the courts, they were most successful by using the citizen
initiative process. The citizen initiative process has been the
only mechanism for enacting legislation reflecting what polls

suggest is the preference of the majority of American citizens:
the legalization of PAD.

Oregon's Act was such a citizen

initiative and currently represents the only U.S. law legalizing
PAD. 30 '

Aside from Oregon's success, four other states

attempted similar initiatives.
California was the first to try the initiative route with a 1988
attempt. This ballot measure, intended to aid those in persistent
vegetative comas and those with AIDS and terminal cancer, did
not garner enough signatures to make it on the ballot.30 2 In 1992,
California tried again.30 3 This time, proponents were able to get
their end-of-life measure on the California ballot as Proposition
161. 3° Proposition 161 was leading in the polls just days before
"make them comfortable." UCC Calls for Groundbreaking Study of Aid in Dying,
supra note 245.
299 Adam Nossiter, Grand Jury Won't Indict Doctor in Hurricane Deaths, N.Y.
TIMES, July 25, 2007, at A10 (quoting Dr. Anna Pou). On July 24, 2007, an Orleans
Parish grand jury refused to indict Dr. Pou on any charges. Id. The American
Medical Association has released its statement praising the grand jury's decision.
Id.
300 For example, the California State Medical Board revoked Dr. Harold Luke's
medical license when the doctor increased a seventy-six-year-old man's morphine
drip tenfold. Id. The Board first concluded this action hastened the patient's death.
Valerie J. Vollmar, Recent Developments in Physician-Assisted Suicide (July 2006),
http://www.willamette.edu/wucl/pdf/pas/2006-07.pdf. On reconsideration, however,
Dr. Luke argued he "intended only to make his patient's last days as painless and
comfortable as possible," and the Board reinstated the doctor's license and reduced
the penalty to a public reprimand for inadequate record keeping. Id.
301 See supra note 240.
302 See Joan Beck, Californians May Be Invited to Vote on a Right to Die, CHI.
TRIB., Apr. 21, 1988, at 23C.
303 See Tom Paulson, No to Aid in Dying-But Fight Goes On, SEATrLE POSTINTELLIGENCER, Nov. 7, 1991, at A9.
304 Proponents of Proposition 161 added safeguards to the initiative including
family notification without the ability to veto, reporting requirements, psychological
evaluation, and a waiting period before the request would be granted. Id.
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the election ,305 but the Catholic Church and other foes "spent
more than $2.8 million on a hard-hitting campaign . . . . The

measure's backers spent one-tenth that amount and saw public
opinion swing from 75% favoring the initiative in some
preelection polls to an election-day defeat of 54% to 46%.
John Brooke, president of Americans for3 7 Death with Dignity,
noted, "We can't match them financially. 0
In 1991, the citizens of Washington State also voted on a PAD
initiative. The initiative, 1-119, sought to give the terminally ill
the right to physician assistance in speeding their deaths.
Initially, 1-119 showed great promise of successfully passing;

even a conference of clergy, the Pacific Northwest Conference of
the United Methodist Church, endorsed it. 30 9
However,
opponents again weighed in with an aggressive campaign, and

the initiative failed in a fifty-four to forty-six percent margin on
November 5, 1991.310
305 As of November 2, 1992, a telephone poll showed support of the initiative was
forty-seven percent for, forty percent against, and thirteen percent undecided.
California: Voters Favor "Death with Dignity" Prop., AM. HEALTH LINE, Nov. 2,
1992.
306 Bailey, supra note 92 ("People felt that the [California Medical Association]
and the Catholic Church were the reason Proposition 161 was defeated .... "); see
also California: Voters Reject Health CarePropositions,AM. HEALTH LINE, Nov. 4,
1992. (noting fifty-four percent against, forty-six percent for the California Death
with Dignity Act): Polls Show, supra note 144.
307 Bailey, supra note 92.

308 Rob Carson, Washington's 1-119, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Mar.-Apr. 1992,
at 7, 8. It also would expand the definition of terminally ill to include coma and
persistent vegetative state. Id. at 8; see also Paulson, supra note 303. The bill was
in response to Cruzan and sought to clearly define a patient's ability to refuse
medical treatment even to the point of ending life. See William Bole, Right-to-Die
Debate Zips Past Cruzan Case, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, June 22, 1991, at

D6.
309 Diego Ribadeneira, Euthanasia Support Is Spreading, SEATILE POSTINTELLIGENCER, June 22, 1991, at D6.

310 Carson, supra note 308, at 7; Paulson, supra note 303. 1-119 contained many
safeguards to prevent acts such as euthanasia from occurring, including requiring
that the request be voluntary and in writing from a "conscious, competent" patient
and that the request be certified by "two physicians, one of them the attending
physician ....
that the patient had six months or less to live." Carson, supra note
308, at 9. Yet reasons for the failure, voiced by the Catholic Archbishop of Seattle,
concerned the lack of safeguards including: (1) it did not define competency, (2) it
did not require patients seeking to end their lives to be Washington residents, (3) it
required no special training required of physicians to assist patients in dying, and (4)
it contained no safeguards for the families or loved ones of the person seeking to
die. Thomas J. Murphy, Initiative 119-A Real Nightmare, SEATILE TIMES, Oct.
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In the fall of 1998, Michigan voters addressed the PAD issue
in Proposal B. 3'
Proposal B would have legalized the
"prescription of a lethal dose of medication to terminally ill,
competent, informed adults in order to commit suicide., 312 The
measure failed by a significant margin. 31 3
"Proposal B
supporters blamed the downturn [of support] on an intense
multimillion-dollar ad campaign by a coalition of health care,
religious and civil rights organizations" that raised more than
five million dollars in contributions. 314 In contrast, advocates of
Proposal
B had raised only $300,000 and produced one television
3 15
ad.

In 2000, Maine made the most recent attempt to pass a ballot
initiative to give people the right to seek physician assistance in
death. 16 Following the Maine legislature's rejection in February
1998 of a bill that would have legalized physician-assisted
suicide, supporters launched the PRO 916 campaign collecting
petition signatures to put the proposal on the ballot in 2000.317

Although the margin of votes was very close, PRO 916 failed to
318
pass.
Oregon alone successfully passed a measure legalizing PAD.
In 1994, Oregon voters approved Oregon's Death with Dignity
26, 1991, at C9. Some sectors also feared the initiative was euthanasia in disguise.
Death with Dignity-An Attempt to Confuse and Deceive by Hemlock Society,
SEATrLE TIMES, Sept. 24, 1990, at A9.
311 Proposal B was in response to a statute enacted by the Michigan legislature
that banned assisted suicide. The Proposal would instead have made assisted
suicide legal. Michigan: Poll Shows Suicide Measure Heading to Defeat, AM.
HEALTH LINE, Oct. 26, 1998 (noting as early as October 1998, fifty-four percent of
voters opposed the measure, forty percent supported it, and six percent were
unsure).
312 Michigan Voters Soundly Reject Physician Assisted Suicide, CNN.CoM, Nov. 3,
1998, http://www.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/stories/1998/11/03/election/ballots/
assisted.suicide/index.html.
313 See id.
314

Id.

Id. Some also believe that Dr. Kevorkian's more aggressive euthanasia
activities also contributed to sway public opinion against the measure. See, e.g.,
Joyce Howard Price, Maine Voters Say No to Assisted Suicide Among Ballot Issues,
WASH. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2000, at A15.
316 Maine: Voters Narrowly Defeat Assisted Suicide Measure, AM. HEALTH LINE,
Nov. 8, 2000; see also Price, supra note 315.
317 Vollmar, Nov. 2007 Developments, supra note 281.
318 The vote was 330,671 (51.3%) against and 313,303 (48.7%) for the measure.
315
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Act by a margin of two percent.319 Oregon's Act exempts from
civil or criminal liability state-licensed physicians who, in
compliance with the Act's specific safeguards, dispense or
prescribe a lethal dose of drugs upon the request of a terminally
ill patient.32 °
A number of physicians, patients, and residential treatment
facilities challenged Oregon's Act and were able to obtain an
injunction staying its implementation based on potential
violations of their freedom of association, freedom of religion,
due process, and equal protection rights. 321 However, the Ninth
Circuit vacated for lack of standing and ultimately lifted the
injunction in February of 1997.322 Just about a week after the

Oregon's Act survived an
Ninth Circuit lifted the injunction,
323
initiative effort to repeal it.
The Catholic Church was heavily involved in both the 1994
and 1997 initiative campaigns. In 1994, opponents outspent
proponents of the initiative almost four to one.324 "[T]he
Catholic church remain[ed] the dominant financial player. In
1994, almost half of the $1.5 million spent in opposition to
legalization of doctor-assisted suicide came from Catholic
325
dioceses and Catholic hospitals in Oregon and elsewhere.,
In 1997, Church leaders tried to lower their public profiles:
"We didn't want this to backfire on us as it did in 1994, when
they said this is the Catholic Church, or the religious right, or

319 See Michael C. Dorf, FindLaw Forum: Telling States What to Do in Cases of
Physician-AssistedSuicide, CNN.coM, Nov. 19, 2001, http://archives.cnn.com/2001/
LAW/11/columns/fl.dorf.assisted.suicide.11.19/.
320 Death with Dignity Act, OR. REV. STAT. § 127.885 (2007).
321 See Lee v. State, 869 F. Supp. 1491, 1491 (D. Or. 1994). The District Court
imposed a preliminary injunction in this case. The next year, the court issued a
permanent injunction in Lee v. State, 891 F. Supp. 1439, 1439 (D. Or. 1995). The
plaintiffs alleged violations of the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment, their First Amendment rights of freedom to exercise
religion and to associate, and their statutory rights under the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990. Lee, 869 F. Supp. at 1493.
322 Lee v. Oregon, 107 F.3d 1382, 1386 (9th Cir. 1997).
323 Vollmar, Feb. 1998 Developments, supra note 280.
324 Hill & Green, supra note 246.
325 Catholic Church Alters Tactics on Suicide Law, supra note 246; see also Hill &
Green, supra note 246 (noting approximately one month from the end of the
campaign, supporters of Measure 16 had raised only $260,056 in contrast to
opponent's war chest of $1,034,000).
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religious extremists, or conservatives., 326 Despite its lower
profile, the Catholic Church ramped up its opposition. In the
1997 campaign, the opponents to PAD outspent the supporters
almost six to one. Catholic organizations contributed
about half
•.• 327
of the over $2.3 million raised by the opposition.
Despite the
significant imbalance of funding, Oregon voters rejected the
repeal efforts and renewed their support for PAD by a margin of
328
twenty percent .
3. FederalAffronts to Oregon's Death with Dignity Act
In 2001, Attorney General Ashcroft issued an interpretive

rule ("Directive") declaring physicians in violation of the
Controlled Substances Act for prescribing lethal doses of
controlled substances in PAD situations. 329 Ashcroft's Directive

pitted the Controlled Substances Act, a federal law not
specifically addressing PAD, against Oregon's Act, which did
specifically address the issue. The physicians were licensed, and
the drugs were ones they were allowed to prescribe under the
Controlled Substances Act. Although lethal doses of these
prescriptions were legal under Oregon's Act, Ashcroft declared

that prescribing them in PAD circumstances was "not a
legitimate medical practice" under the Controlled Substances
Act. 330 Thus, under the Directive, specific conduct authorized by
Oregon's Act could render a practitioner's federal registration
326 Catholic Church Alters Tactics on Suicide Law, supra note 246.
327 Id.
In both campaigns, the PAD opponents significantly outspent the
proponents. For support of the repeal, "[c]ampaign funds raised as of 9/24/97
amounted to $2.25 million, including $800,000 from Catholic archdioceses around
the country, $250,000 from the U.S. Catholic Conference, and $100,000 from
Oregon Right to Life." Valerie J. Vollmar, Recent Developments in PhysicianAssisted Deaths (Oct. 1997), http://www.willamette.edu/wucl/pdf/pas/1997-10.pdf.
"Opponents of Measure 51 include[d] Governor Kitzhaber (an emergency room
physician) and a group of physicians known as Physicians for Death with Dignity.
[Opponents'] [c]ampaign funds raised as of 9/24/97 amounted to $370,000, including
$150,000 each from a local millionaire and international philanthropist George
Soros." Id.
328 OR. DEP'T OF HUMAN SERVS., EIGHTH ANNUAL REPORT ON OREGON'S

DEATH WITH DIGNITY ACr 6 (2006), available at http://www.oregon.gov/DHS/ph/
pas/docs/year8.pdf. The total votes against repeal were 666,275, while the total for
repeal were 445,830. Official Results State Measure No. 51 (Nov. 4, 1997),
http://www.sos.state.or.us/elections/nov497/other.info/m5labst.htm.
329 Dispensing of Controlled Substances to Assist Suicide, 66 Fed. Reg. 56,607,
56,608 (Nov. 9, 2001), invalidatedby Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243 (2006).
330 Id.
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inconsistent with the public interest, and therefore subject to
possible suspension or revocation.13' The Directive specifically

targeted health care practitioners in Oregon and instructed the
U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration to enforce this
determination regardless of whether state law authorized or
permitted such conduct by practitioners.33 2
A physician, a pharmacist, several terminally ill patients, and

the State of Oregon filed suit seeking an injunction against the
Directive the day it was published. 333 On appeal, in Oregon v.
Ashcroft, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the
Ashcroft Directive was unlawful and unenforceable because it
violated the plain language of the Controlled Substances Act,
contravened Congress's express legislative intent, and

overstepped the bounds of the U.S. Attorney General's statutory
authority.

The court found that the Controlled Substances

Act was enacted to combat drug abuse, and that "to the extent
that it authorize[d] the federal government to make decisions

about the practice of medicine, those decisions [were] delegated
to the Secretary of Health and Human Services, not to the
Attorney General. '' 335 Ashcroft's successor, Attorney General

Alberto Gonzales, appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.
In January 2006, the Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth
Circuit's decision in Gonzales v. Oregon.336 In a six-to-three
opinion, the Gonzales majority held that the U.S. Attorney
General could not prohibit doctors from prescribing regulated
drugs for use in physician-assisted suicide under Oregon's Death
See id.
Id. Just three years before, then Attorney General Janet Reno had refused to
challenge physicians practicing under Oregon's Act, deciding not to "displace the
states as the primary regulators of the medical profession, or to override a state's
determination as to what constitutes legitimate medical practice in the absence of a
federal law prohibiting that practice." Letter from Janet Reno, Attorney Gen., to
Orrin G. Hatch, Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Comm. (June 5, 1998), in S. REP.
No. 105-372, at 9 n.10 (1998).
333 State v. Ashcroft, 192 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1079-80, 1087 (D. Or. 2002), aff'd, 368
F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2004), affd sub nom., Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243 (2006)
(finding that Attorney General Ashcroft exceeded the authority delegated to the
Attorney General by the Controlled Substances Act, and finding that Congress did
not intend, through the Controlled Substances Act or otherwise, to override state
decisions concerning what constitutes the legitimate practice of medicine).
334 Ashcroft, 368 F.3d at 1120.
335 Id. at 1131.
336 546 U.S. 243 (2006).
331

332
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with Dignity Act.337 Furthermore, the Court held that the
Attorney General may not issue a directive if the federal statute
is not ambiguous and if Congress has not specifically delegated
that role to the Attorney General. 338 The Court found that the
Controlled Substances Act was not ambiguous: Congress had
delegated to the Attorney General only the authority to
promulgate rules relating to "registration" and "control" of the
dispensing of controlled substances. 339 The Court further stated
that "control" means "to add a drug or substance . . . to a
schedule, 34 0 following specified procedures, and that because the
Directive did not concern scheduling of substances and was not
issued under the required procedures, it could not fall under the
Attorney General's control authority.34'
The Court also found that the Attorney General's Directive
could not be justified under the Controlled Substances Act's
registration provisions because it deals with much more than
registration 342 and it does not undertake the Act's five-factor
analysis for determining when registration is "inconsistent with
the public interest., 343 The Gonzales majority based its decision
on a close reading of the Controlled Substances Act and focused
its result on the administrative power of the Attorney General,
stating that the Attorney General's Directive purported to
declare that using controlled substances for PAD is a crime,
which requires authority "well beyond the Attorney General's
statutory power to register or deregister [physicians]. 3 5
By focusing on the administrative power of the Attorney
General, the Gonzales majority avoided the preemption and
federalism issues raised in the Ninth Circuit's opinion. The
Ninth Circuit suggested that any effort to limit an Oregon statute
337 Id. at 274-75. Justice Kennedy authored the opinion. He was joined in the
majority opinion by Justices Stevens, O'Connor, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer.
Justices Roberts, Scalia, and Thomas dissented.
338

Id. at 255-56.

339

Id. at 259 (interpreting 21 U.S.C. § 821 (2006)).
Id. at 260 (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 802(5) (2006)).

340
342

Id.
Id. at 249.

343

Id. at 250-51 (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 823(f) (2006)).

344

Id. at 261.

341

Id. Thus, the Ashcroft directive was not entitled to either Auer or Chevron
deference. Id. at 269.
345

OREGON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 86, 895

defining legitimate medical practice in that state would require a
clear statement of preemption in the federal statute.34 In some
respects, the Gonzales court appeared to accept the Ninth
Circuit's reasoning. Although the Court concluded that it was
''unnecessary even to consider the application of clear statement
requirements . . .or presumptions against pre-emption . . . to
reach [its] commonsense conclusion., 34 7 It also noted:
Just as the conventions of expression indicate that Congress is
unlikely to alter a statute's obvious scope and division of
authority through muffled hints, the background principles of
our federal system also belie the notion that Congress would
regl ate areas
use such an obscure grant of authority to
traditionally supervised by the States' police power.
Similarly, the Court indicated that Ashcroft's effort to make
actions that were authorized by Oregon's Death with Dignity
Act illegal would have given him:
[T]he power to effect a radical shift of authority from the
States to the Federal Government to define general standards
of medical practice in every locality. The text and structure of
the [Controlled Substances Act] show that Congress did not
balance
have this far-reaching intent to alter the federal-state
34 9
and the congressional role in maintaining it.
Justices Roberts, Scalia, and Thomas dissented. Justice Scalia
authored the primary dissent, and Justice Thomas wrote his own
separate dissenting opinion in addition to joining the primary
dissent.
The dissenters not only voiced support for the authority of the
Attorney General to issue the Ashcroft Directive, but they also
disputed the majority's deference for state sovereignty over the
PAD issue. First, Justice Scalia acknowledged federalism
concerns by stating:
The Court's decision today is perhaps driven by a feeling
that the subject of assisted suicide is none of the Federal
Government's business. It is easy to sympathize with that
position. The prohibition or deterrence of assisted suicide is
certainly not among the enumerated powers conferred on the
United States by the Constitution, and it is within the realm of
346 Oregon v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 1118, 1125 (9th Cir. 2004).
347 Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 275 (citations omitted).
348 Id.
349 Id.
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addressed by the
public morality (bonos mores) traditionally
35
0
so-called police power of the States.

However, the dissenters went on to waive aside the federalism
objection, justifying use of the expanded Commerce Clause for
their conclusion that the Attorney General's interpretation of
the Controlled Substances Act was an appropriate way to
emasculate Oregon's Act:
From an early time in our national history, the Federal
Government has used its enumerated powers, such as its power
to regulate interstate commerce, for the purpose of protecting
public morality ....

Unless we are to repudiate a long and

well-established principle of our jurisprudence, using the
federal commerce power to prevent assisted suicide is
unquestionably permissible. The question before us is not
whether Congress can do this, or even whether Congress
should do this; but simply whether Congress 351has done this in
the CSA. I think there is no doubt that it has.
Justice Scalia's stance in the primary dissent is puzzling. In
other Supreme Court opinions, Justice Scalia had espoused the
importance of initiatives and states' rights. 2 With respect to
specifically chided the
morality in the context of abortion, he
•. 353

Consistent with this
Court for intruding on state sovereignty.
leaning, Justice Scalia, in 2002, complained to an audience at
Lewis and Clark Law School in Oregon that judges should not
usurp the role of legislatures.35 4 In Justice Scalia's opinion, if
people wanted to extend rights like assisted suicide, they should

350
351

Id. at 298 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 298-99.

352 See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 647 (1996) (Scalia, J., joined by
Rehnquist, C.J., and Thomas, J., dissenting) ("[Amendment 2, a citizen initiative,]
put directly, to all the citizens of the State, the question: Should homosexuality be
given special protection? They answered no. The Court today asserts that this
most democratic of procedures is unconstitutional."); see also Gonzales v. Raich,
545 U.S. 1, 34 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring); Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88, 114 (2004)
(Kennedy, J., joined by Scalia, J., dissenting); Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs,
538 U.S. 721, 741 (1972) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
353 Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 532 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (arguing the Court should not assert its sovereignty in a field in which it
has little business).
354 Solomon, supra note 240, at 23.
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do it like the people of Oregon did, through the initiative-

legislative process, not through the courts.
In the Gonzales dissent, however, Justice Scalia suggests that
the Supreme Court should defer to the Attorney General's
interpretation of the Controlled Substances Act. Thus, he would
give "a single Executive officer,, 356 who is not elected, power to

usurp the effort of Oregon citizens to extend their PAD rights
through the initiative process. Further, this dissent urged
nonelected members of the Court to interpret the Controlled
Substances Act to usurp Oregon's Death with Dignity Act by
concluding that "[v]irtually every relevant source of
authoritative meaning confirms that the phrase 'legitimate
medical

purpose'

35 7

does

not include

intentionally

assisted

suicide.,

Justice Thomas's separate dissent in Gonzales is also
disturbing. Justice Thomas has been one of the most vocal
358
In Gonzales v.
supporters of the citizen initiative process.
355 See id.; see also Robin K. Chand, Note, Deconstructing Gonzales v. Oregon:
When PoliticalAgendas Yield to Rudimentary Notions of Federalism and Statutory
Interpretation,50 HOw. L.J. 229, 255-57 (2006).
356 Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 275; see also Friedman, supra note 13, at 392 ("Congress
often shirks important decisions by foisting them off on bureaucratic officials."); id.
at 392 n.317 (citing DANIEL A. FARBER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:

THEMES FOR THE CONSTITUTION'S THIRD CENTURY

966-67 (1993) (arguing that legislators delegate powers of standard creation to
agencies in order to avoid conflict issues)). "Commentators especially point to
actors in administrative agencies." Id. at 394 n.325 (citing John Devlin, Toward a
State Constitutional Analysis of Allocation of Powers: Legislators and Legislative
Appointees Performing Administrative Functions, 66 TEMP. L. REV. 1205, 1268
(1993) (arguing that the ability of legislators to appoint administrative officials
"raises obvious problems of lack of electoral accountability"); Cass R. Sunstein,
ConstitutionalismAfter the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REV. 421, 447 (1987) (noting
that agency actors are "not responsive to the public as a whole")).
357 Solomon, supra note 240, at 23 (noting that although the court took a pretty
good whack at John Ashcroft for assuming more power than Congress granted, the
court was unanimous in its view that Congress could ban assisted suicides under the
Commerce Clause).
358 See, e.g., U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 883-84 (1995)
(Thomas, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., O'Connor, J., Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[A
constitutional amendment, enacted by initiative,] is not the act of a state legislature;
it is the act of the people of [the state], adopted at a direct election and inserted into
the State Constitution. The majority never explains why giving effect to the
people's decision would violate the 'democratic principles' that undergird the
Constitution."). Justice O'Connor hails from Arizona, which is a strong initiative
state, and her departure from the Court may impact recognition of the initiative
power in future Supreme Court decisions. Four other justices are also from
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Raich, Justice Thomas dissented when the majority found the
Controlled Substances Act preempted California's medical
marijuana initiative.35 9
He especially railed against the
majority's intrusion into state rights: "One searches the Court's
opinion in vain for any hint of what aspect of American life is
reserved to the States. ' , 360
Furthermore, he touted the
federalism benefit that the majority decision stifled by saying:
The majority prevents States like California from devising
drug policies that they have concluded provide much-needed
respite to the seriously ill. It does so without any serious
inquiry into the necessity for federal regulation or the
propriety of "displac[ing] state regulation in areas of
traditional state concern." The majority's rush to embrace
federal power "is especially unfortunate given the importance
of showing respect for the sovereign States that comprise our
Federal Union." Our federalist system, properly understood,
allows California and a growing number of other States to
decide for themselves
how to safeguard the health and welfare
36 1
of their citizens.

Remarkably, Justice Thomas reversed his federalism position
in the Gonzales dissent.
In Raich, he urged the federal
government to avoid interfering with state issues determined by
initiative states: Justices Kennedy and Breyer are both from California; Justice
Stevens is from Illinois; and Justice Souter is from Massachusetts, which has a
modified initiative process.
359 Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 57 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
360 Id. at 70. Justice Thomas wrote:
The majority holds that Congress may regulate intrastate cultivation and
possession of medical marijuana under the Commerce Clause, because
such conduct arguably has a substantial effect on interstate commerce. The
majority's decision is further proof that the "substantial effects" test is a
"rootless and malleable standard" at odds with the constitutional design.
One searches the Court's opinion in vain for any hint of what aspect of
American life is reserved to the States. Yet this Court knows that "[t]he
Constitution created a Federal Government of limited powers." That is
why today's decision will add no measure of stability to our Commerce
Clause jurisprudence: This Court is willing neither to enforce limits on
federal power, nor to declare the Tenth Amendment a dead letter. If
stability is possible, it is only by discarding the stand-alone substantial
effects test and revisiting our definition of "Commerce among the several
States." Congress may regulate interstate commerce-not things that
affect it, even when summed together, unless truly "necessary and proper"
to regulating interstate commerce.
Id. at 67-71.
361 Id. at 74 (citations omitted).
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citizen initiative; in Gonzales he dissented even though the

Court upheld Oregon's initiative law by determining that the
Attorney General had no authority to interfere with it. Justice
Thomas's sole explanation for his conclusion in Gonzales was his
unhappiness about how the Court dealt with similar issues in
Raich36
. 2

As justification for the result in Gonzales, it would be overly
simplistic to observe that all of the dissenting justices are
Catholics.363

Whatever the cause, the realignment of former

federalism advocates over to the federal, instead of the state,
side of the PAD issue is somewhat startling.
Although PAD rights advocates may have little chance of

making much progress through the Supreme Court for years to
come, the Gonzales decision appears to reaffirm the role of

federalism and the initiative process in providing some
resolutions on this controversial issue.

362 See Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 302 (2006) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Justice Thomas stated:
The Court's reliance upon the constitutional principles that it rejected in
Raich ["limitations of federalism, which allow the States 'great latitude
under their police powers to legislate as to the protection of the lives,
limbs, health, comfort, and quiet of all persons,"' Id. at 270 (majority
opinion)]-albeit under the guise of statutory interpretation-is perplexing
to say the least.
Id. at 302 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
363 Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Roberts are all Catholic.
Joan Biskupic,
Opinion, Changing Faith, WASH. POST, Aug. 4, 1996, at Cl; Dennis Coyle, Studying
John Roberts, NAT'L REV. ONLINE, Sept. 1, 2005, http://www.nationalreview.com/
comment/coyle200509010733.asp.
364 Considering the vehemence with which the Catholic Church has opposed the
expansion of PAD rights, it is interesting to consider that the most recently sworn
justice, Samuel A. Alito, Jr., is a Catholic. Warren Richey, Role of Alito's Catholic
Faith Could Be Tricky Question, CHI. SUN TIMES, Nov. 6, 2005, at A30. Justice
Anthony Kennedy is also a Catholic. Biskupic, supra note 363, at C1. Although
Kennedy authored the majority opinion in Gonzales, he has joined the other
Catholic justices on several five-to-four majority opinions in 2007. Kennedy sided
with Roberts, Scalia, Thomas, and Alito in thirteen of the nineteen five-to-four split
decisions issued by the Supreme Court in the 2006-07 term. See Stuart Taylor, Jr. &
Evan Thomas, The Power Broker, NEWSWEEK, July 16, 2007, at 36, 36-37 (quoting
one of Kennedy's former clerks saying, "He thinks he is the living embodiment or
transmitter of the nation's bedrock values."). Also, the fact that Kennedy authored
the majority opinion in Gonzales might explain why it is so restrained, focusing
primarily on the scope of the Attorney General's administrative powers.
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Fast-Food Government and Physician-AssistedDeath
CONCLUSION

In establishing one of the first large-scale democracies in the
modern world, the Founders appeased states' rights advocates
Federalism blended
through the construct of federalism.
national and local power by granting the federal government
limited enumerated authority and reserving to the states and the
people some measure of decentralized authority over their
affairs.
This diffusion of power helped legitimize the
government and allowed for a robust democracy that is more
responsive and accountable to those governed.
One of the advantages of federalism is that states may act as
laboratories for social experimentation allowing the entire
country to benefit from the influx of diverse ideas from a variety
of sources. Innovation is an evolutionary process that works
best when experimentation is diffused. The odds of finding
creative solutions improve when multiple governments are
working on alternative options. Legislation that centralizes and
limits experimentation can stifle progress in areas in which there
is no need for national uniformity.
The debate over physician-assisted death illustrates the key
role citizen initiatives can play in federalism by helping create
state laboratories of experimentation to address controversial
issues. Although polls show that a majority of Americans
support PAD, neither Congress nor a single state legislature has
enacted a statute legalizing it. All bills introduced on the topic
have been snared in the pressure points of the traditional
legislative process.
These pressure points were incorporated into the traditional
legislative process to filter out extremes and achieve compromise
legislation that reflected both majority and minority interests.
However, minority interest groups can sometimes avoid
compromise and instead impose their sensibilities on the
majority by strategically employing the pressure points to block
all legislation in a controversial area. Minority view religious
groups have been using this pressure point mechanism in
legislatures throughout the country by enlisting a few influential
legislators or requesting executive vetoes to block every single
bill proposing to legalize PAD from successfully navigating
through the traditional legislative process.
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These same minority interest groups have not had the same
degree of effectiveness in the context of citizen initiatives.
Outspending PAD proponents has improved the odds of a
minority interest prevailing in state legislatures and some
initiative campaigns. However, despite outspending the PAD
proponents by as much as six to one, the minority interest
religious groups were not able to prevent the majority of Oregon
citizens from voicing their preference by enacting the only law in
the country that legalizes PAD.
Oregon alone was successful in passing a pro-PAD statute
because the law was enacted by citizen initiative. Some criticize
citizen initiatives as "fast-food government" because they can
circumvent the more time consuming traditional legislative
process. Yet, precisely because initiatives can avoid some of the
shortcomings of the traditional process, they are sometimes the
best, or the only, choice for addressing controversial issues that
cannot make it through the legislative pressure points.
The Supreme Court has failed to recognize a constitutional
"right to die," and Congress has failed to pass specific legislation
on the issue, so the debate over physician-assisted death has
become an exemplar for the role of citizen initiatives in allowing
states to serve as laboratories in a federalism model. Oregon's
Act is initiative lawmaking at its best. A clear majority of
Oregonians supported the law: they voted twice on the topic
and on the second vote, affirmed the law by a majority of
approximately sixty percent. Furthermore, PAD is the type of
issue that most appropriately should be resolved at the local, as
opposed to the federal, level. It involves health, a traditional
state concern. It is a highly personal, moral issue that does not
directly impact or infringe the rights of others. Furthermore,
there is no commercial or other reason for national uniformity.
Fast-food chains thrive in the United States because they
serve a need of the people. Sometimes fast-food fare is not good
for us, but other times it can really hit the spot. Although the
fast-food initiative process is imperfect in some contexts,
Oregon's Death with Dignity Act illustrates that an initiative
really can be the best mechanism for promoting federalism. By
allowing power to diffuse to the citizen level, Oregon citizens
were able to achieve something that no state legislature has been
able to accomplish: the creation of a state laboratory for social
experimentation on physician-assisted death.

